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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Vermette, Matthew, M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, September 2013.  
Assessing the Economic Benefits of Cooperation Among Small Forest Operators. 
Supervisor: Hayley Hesseln 
 
The independent operators (IOs) are small forest operators with timber allocation 
volumes in Saskatchewan under 20,000 m³. Due to their scale, this group is characterized by 
above- average industry wood procurement and transaction costs. In the past, IO’s above average 
costs were compensated by above average market prices for the products they produce and 
limited competition. In recent years, increased competition confounded by low demand and low 
prices, as well as rapidly increasing operating costs have made it necessary for IOs to restructure 
operations to reduce costs and increase competitiveness.   
This thesis investigates the benefits of restructuring IOs using a cooperative business 
model to help reduce costs, eliminate competitive inefficiencies within the industry, and create 
economies of scope in IO fibre procurement activities and fibre utilization. Within the literature 
review, numerous cooperative models used in the forest and agriculture industries and the 
advantages and disadvantages associated with each cooperative type are explored.  Next, the 
potential economic benefits of restructuring IOs under the new generation cooperative model are 
examined using a comparative economic analysis of the business as usual fibre procurement cost 
model and IO NGC fibre procurement cost model derived within this study. Data obtained from 
an IO case study and interviews with IO industry representatives is fitted to the models to 
generate fibre procurement cost data for each model. The resulting fibre procurement cost values 
for each model are then compared and further examined using sensitivity and breakeven analysis.       
The results of this analysis reveal that the new generation cooperative model has the 
potential to provide significant economic benefits to IOs through the creation of economies of 
scope in harvesting costs, but has little effect on the six other costs that make are included in 
fibre procurement costs. The analysis also reveals that so long as the NGC consist of IOs that 
require both large and small diameter fibre, the IO NGC has the potential to provide significant 
economies of scope in fibre utilization.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 1.0 Introduction to the Independent Operators (IOs) 
 The independent operators (IOs) are small forest businesses with fibre allocation volumes 
in Saskatchewan forests ranging from 500 m³ to 20,000 m³. While a small minority of IOs are 
strictly logging firms, the vast majority produce forest products ranging from dimensional 
lumber, timbers, and railway ties to more specialized products such as flooring, paneling, treated 
fence posts, utility poles and high quality construction logs. This is vastly different from other 
areas of Canada with a large IO presence; e.g. Northern Ontario, where the majority of IOs are 
logging firms who do not engage in value added product manufacturing, but rather sell fibre to 
larger mills (Harrison, 2009).  
IOs have been operating within Saskatchewan’s forest industry for over 100 years and, as 
such, are an important component of the province’s heritage. In fact, many of the IOs are family 
owned companies that have been operating for generations. Despite their history in the forest 
sector, IOs have, for the most part, not engaged in industry-level organization or cooperation. 
While they briefly formed an association in the 1980s, it failed to generate significant 
momentum or result in significant benefits. In 2007, the IOs formed the Independent Forest 
Operators of Saskatchewan (IFOS), which was mandated with lobbying, and investigating and 
implementing strategies to increase profitability. While IFOS was able to develop strong 
relationships with government and initiate research projects related to IO issues, member interest 
and participation declined with the province’s forest industry decline and the economic 
challenges that occurred beginning in 2008.  
Since IFOS ceased activities in 2010, the economic climate has worsened. According to former 
IFOS president Perry Vermette, several IOs have exited the industry and many others have had 
reduced sales. As a result, many IOs have seen drastic reductions in the scale of their operations 
and are only marginally viable. Consequently, the IOs that have survived the economic downturn 
have recently expressed an interest in reforming the organization (Vermette, 2012). 
1.1 IO Challenges 
Due to scale, the IOs are characterized by above-industry average fibre procurement costs 
and transaction costs.  In the past, IO’s costs were not a problem because market prices were 
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above average for their products and they faced limited competition within markets. In recent 
years however, forest product markets have become increasingly competitive, which has been 
confounded by low demand and low prices.  Additionally, operating costs have risen faster than 
inflation because of higher fuel and energy costs.  As such, the IOs have indicated a desire to 
restructure operations to reduce costs and increase competitiveness.   
In addition to these challenges, IOs have weak tenure security and a lack of access to 
fibre, both of which are a result of the provincial forest tenure structure. The sections that follow 
discuss these challenges in greater detail and provide a basis for a solution-based approach to 
restructuring of Saskatchewan’s IO industry. 
1.1.1 Downturn in the Forest Products Economy  
Over the past decade, the Government of Saskatchewan has commissioned a small body 
of research to identify the economic issues affecting Saskatchewan’s forest industry and 
providing solutions to increase the competitiveness of Saskatchewan’s forest products producers. 
The Premier’s Task Force on Forest Sector Competitiveness Report (2006) identified a number 
of global factors contributing to the weakened economy including the declining value of the 
American dollar, weak lumber demand caused by the U.S. housing market crash, weakening 
paper markets, an unfair “softwood lumber deal”, and increasing imports of low-cost foreign-
wood products. The same report identified internal factors such as escalating transportation costs 
(including the removal of a fuel tax exemption) and road development costs as having an equally 
significant effect on forest industry firms’ viability and competitiveness (Government of 
Saskatchewan, 2006.) These combined factors resulted in a situation in which IOs are faced with 
low demand, low prices, and increasingly competitive markets.  
1.1.2 Economies of Scale 
Given the IOs’ relatively low allocation volumes in comparison to larger corporate 
entities (e.g. Domtar), it is intuitive that their small-scale operations have an above-industry-
average cost structure and will be less competitive. Less intuitive, are the high transaction costs 
associated with IO fibre procurement. The planning and permitting processes that precede active 
forest harvesting require that information and negotiation costs be incurred by producers. In the 
case of permitting, the information and negotiation costs are fixed and do not vary among 
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producers of different sizes. For example, a producer who harvests 500m3 of timber invests the 
same amount of time and resources into the permitting, development and negotiation processes 
as does a producer who harvests 20,000m3. Similarly, while there are some variations in the 
planning costs of these same producers, many of those costs are largely fixed (Vermette, 2009). 
This creates a situation in which IOs the transaction costs per cubic metre harvested are higher 
for IOs than for medium sized forest producers. 
1.1.3 Tenure and Access to Fibre 
Many IOs identify a lack of access to fibre as a major challenge which inhibits their 
ability to expand their businesses and generate significant economies of scale (Sande, 2009; 
Vermette, 2009). Unlike many other jurisdictions across Canada and the United States that use a 
large proportion of area-based tenure instruments, Saskatchewan’s forest tenure is primarily 
granted through volume-based instruments that grant holders the right to harvest a predetermined 
amount of timber for a period of one to 20 years. The majority of the province’s timber is held in 
the form of forest management agreements with terms of twenty years and term supply licences 
with terms of approximately ten years. At the current time, these instruments lack enforcement 
mechanisms that require tenure holder’s to utilize their allocation volumes and as a result the 
province’s resource is under harvested. Historically, a number of IOs attempted to increase their 
annual allocation to meet surges in demand and to plan for growth, however, were unsuccessful 
because the current tenure structure fully allocates timber to existing tenure holders indefinitely 
(Vermette, 2009). Currently, Saskatchewan does not use tenure instruments such as direct sale 
auctions that would allow producers to competitively bid for allocation volumes. The lack of 
opportunities for increased tenure volumes has resulted in a situation in which the growth 
potential of IOs is limited by fibre availability.  
1.1.4 Fibre Utilization 
 All IO value added production processes share one common trait, they have high fibre 
specificity. IO products such as lumber, construction logs, and railway ties, for example, require 
large diameter logs exceeding six inches in diameter, while IO products such as fence posts and 
rails require small diameter longs under six inches in diameter. This is problematic as the trees 
harvested by IOs carry a significant taper and produce cut to length shortwood pieces that belong 
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to both the over six inch and under six inch diameter classes. Given that IOs are generally 
producing a single product or range of products that require only fibre belonging to one of the 
diameter classes, a significant portion of fibre cannot be utilized by each IO’s production 
processes. In the past, some IOs with larger allocation volumes were able to sell the fibre that 
could not be utilized by their production process to larger saw mills and pulp mills to recover a 
portion of their costs, however, the downturn in the forest sector has led to the closure of all but 
one of these facilities in the PAFMA. This, coupled with the absence of an established market for 
wood fibre in Saskatchewan has created a situation in which many IOs are unable to sell the 
wood that cannot be utilized in their production processes on a cost recovery or profitable basis. 
Instead, this fibre is often maintained in inventories until IO firms are in a position to write off 
the inventory or is sold at a heavily discounted rate to cover the in yard handling costs (Vermette, 
2009; Sande, 2009). The net effect of this is an increase in the overall fibre costs for IOs. To 
date, there has been no organized attempt by IOs to engage in trading of wood fibre to overcome 
this challenge, despite the fact that the proportion of IOs (on a per cubic metre basis) requiring 
large diameter material is approximately equal to the proportion requiring small diameter 
material. 
1.2 Purpose 
I have hypothesized that the IOs might be able to achieve fibre procurement cost 
reductions through the formation of a fibre procurement cooperative. More specifically, the 
cooperative model has the potential to create economies of scope in IO fibre procurement and 
increase fibre utilization, and would allow for the elimination of the competitive inefficiencies 
that exist within the industry, thereby further reducing production costs. Through the 
development of cost models that depict the current IO fibre procurement scenario (factual case) 
and the proposed IO cooperative fibre procurement scenario (counter-factual case), this study 
will seek to use a comparative analysis of fibre procurement costs under the factual and 
counterfactual models to evaluate whether or not reorganizing the IOs’ fibre procurement 
activities using a cooperative model is a viable option for reorganizing and revitalizing IOs in 
Saskatchewan’s forest sector. If the proposed cooperative fibre procurement model proves to be 
cost reducing, the hypothesis that the formation of a cooperative will result in fibre procurement 
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cost reductions and provide positive net economic benefits to producers will be deemed to be 
true. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The primary objective of this research is to evaluate the possible economic benefits 
provided to IOs through reorganizing fibre procurement operations into a co-operative 
framework. In order to achieve these objectives, this study seeks to do the following: 
1. Analyse the applicability and potential success of the cooperative model in forestry 
and relate that to the Saskatchewan IO case.  
2. Develop a potential IO cooperative structure that focuses on reducing IO fibre 
procurement costs by creating economies of scope for IOs fibre procurement 
activities and increasing fibre utilization for IOs. 
3. Develop a cost model depicting current IO fibre procurement costs and utilization 
(The Factual Model). 
4. Develop a fibre procurement cost model depicting fibre procurement costs and 
utilization under the proposed IO Cooperative (The Counter-factual Model). 
5. Obtain IO fibre procurement cost and utilization data using a case study methodology 
and utilize that data in the running of the factual and counter-factual fibre 
procurement cost models. 
6. Conduct a comparative analysis of the results obtained from the derived factual and 
counter-factual fibre procurement cost models to determine whether or not the 
proposed cooperative model will provide economic benefits to the IOs in the form of 
cost reductions. 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
Chapter two presents the results of the literature review pertaining to the different types 
of forest producer cooperative models used in other jurisdictions. In chapter three, the reader is 
presented with a potential IO co-operative structure and a detailed account of the methodologies 
employed in the analysis. Chapter four begins with the presentation of the current IO fibre 
procurement process and the factual “business as usual” fibre procurement cost model. The 
second half of the chapter discusses the operational details associated with the proposed IO co-
6 
 
operative fibre procurement process and presents the IO cooperative fibre procurement cost 
model.  
In chapter five, the results obtained by fitting the sample IO data into the factual and 
counterfactual fibre procurement cost models is presented and comparatively analyzed. The 
chapter closes with a discussion of the implications of the study and potential future research 
work related to the subject. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
  This chapter presents the results of a literature review focused on the various types of 
cooperative models currently in use and their application in forestry. The chapter also presents 
insight into the current tenure structure that IOs within Saskatchewan operate within. 
Information obtained within this literature review is used in later chapters to derive a potential 
cooperative model for the proposed IO fibre procurement cooperative. 
2.1 The Cooperative Model 
In order to explore forestry cooperatives we must first understand the nature and structure 
of the general cooperative model. A cooperative can be broadly defined as a private organization 
that provides benefits and services to cooperative members, who are also the owners of the 
cooperative. The cooperative model has been used to address a wide variety of challenges in 
almost every sector of the economy (Gertler, 2004; Martin, 2007). Cooperatives play a 
significant role in Canada’s national economy and provide a wide range of benefits to the local 
economies in which they operate. In 2004, cooperatives in sectors such as agriculture, finance, 
fisheries, forestry, health care, housing, manufacturing, and retail employed 85,073 Canadians 
and contributed $27.5 billion to Canada’s GDP (McMartin, 2007).   
In general, the membership of a cooperative consists of a group of individuals or firms 
with common needs and goals whom are located in close geographical proximity (Fulton and 
Gibbings, 2000; McMartin, 2007). In the cooperative model the members have equal control of 
the cooperative, but varying levels of ownership that are tied to the member’s level of equity 
investment in the cooperative. This is counter to the majority of private corporations, in which 
ownership is held by the shareholders and control of the company is held by hired executives 
(Welch, 2001). The self-governance model employed in cooperatives is possible because 
cooperatives are democratically controlled by their membership through the one member, one 
vote system constructed by the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1844 (Fulton, 2000; 
Fulton and Herman, 2000; Haaf and Stefanson, 2001; Welch, 2001). In this system, cooperative 
members elect a board of directors and vote on major policies with equal influence. The board of 
directors is charged with managing the cooperatives’ long term business affairs and in most cases 
8 
 
the board of directors hires an operations manager who, in turn, is charged with managing day to 
day business operations (McMartin, 2007; Welch, 2001). 
In Saskatchewan, cooperatives are required to incorporate at the time of their formation 
(Anonymous, 2009c) and thus become a distinct legal entity (Welch, 2001). This provides an 
advantage in that it allows the corporation to engage in any form of transaction that an individual 
person would be allowed to engage in. For example, a corporation may engage in contracts, 
purchase and own real estate, or become engaged in litigation proceedings. In addition, 
incorporation limits the legal liability of members to ensure that they do not become personally 
responsible for the corporation’s legal or financial obligations. The major disadvantage of 
incorporating is the initial transaction costs associated with establishment.  
The fundamental purpose of a cooperative is to provide increased benefits to its 
membership (Welch, 2001). The cooperative structure can achieve this in many different ways 
and the origin, type, and extent of benefits for the cooperative members depends heavily on the 
objectives of the cooperative. One of the most common benefits is the reduction in costs through 
the creation of economies of scale (Welch, 2001). Economies of scale are created when the fixed 
costs of providing a good or service to the members are spread over more units, thus reducing the 
average cost for a good or service. Economies of scale can also be created when members jointly 
purchase inputs and supplies and are able to purchase larger volumes from vendors and thus 
negotiate lower purchase prices. In some cases the reason for forming a cooperative is not due to 
a need for cost reductions but rather a need for revenue stabilization. This is generally the case 
when there is market failure and producers face low prices. In this case the formation of a 
cooperative often results in a situation in which producers are able to work together to ensure 
that they obtain higher prices (Welch, 2001). In both cases, the members are able to gain 
increased market power through cooperation.  
Cooperatives are also formed to ensure that producers, consumers, workers, or even 
entire communities are able to access goods and services (Welch, 2001). In some cases the goods 
or services do not exist or are unavailable because neither the private sector nor the government 
is willing to provide them. In other cases the private firm or government agency that provided 
the goods has ceased to exist or moved out of the region. Whatever the case, the cooperative 
model is often used to provide goods and services that are absent or in jeopardy of being lost to 
their membership. The cooperative model also provides members with the ability to pool their 
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assets and increase their ability to procure financing for larger projects and capital equipment 
including new technologies. The joint investment in these ventures also allows the cooperative 
members to pool the risk of investing. This reduces the expected loss for each member (Welch, 
2001). In this way, risk pooling through cooperative formation can provide additional incentive 
to make larger investments. This not only increases the opportunities for the individual members 
but it also increases the opportunities for overall community economic development (Welch, 
2001).  
Another method by which cooperatives generate benefits for their members is through the 
reduction in transaction costs. Transaction costs are generally classified as negotiation costs, 
information costs, or enforcement costs. Negotiation costs are those costs that are incurred in the 
formation of an enterprise, the negotiation of contracts, and the negotiation of prices (Hobbs and 
Kerr, 1999). Negotiation costs generally include such things as fees charged by lawyers, 
accountants, and other professionals. Information costs are the costs incurred by searching for 
and organizing information that is essential to the operation of an enterprise. Enforcement costs 
consist of all costs associated with ensuring that contracts are honoured and action is taken when 
they are not (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999). Enforcement costs may vary from protecting property from 
theft, to ensuring that a customer pays, to litigating a supplier that has defaulted on a supply 
contract. Cooperatives are often able to reduce these costs by ensuring that members have access 
to professionals who can help them to create more efficient contracts at a reasonable price 
(Fulton and Sanderson, 2002). Transaction costs might also be reduced through the creation of 
economies of scale when cooperatives engage in transactions that involve much larger quantities. 
By negotiating a single contract for the entire cooperative, repetition of transactions is eliminated 
and fixed costs are spread over many more units. The effect of this is a reduction in average 
transaction costs, increased profit margins, and thus an increased ability to remain competitive.  
Not all of the benefits that cooperatives provide are economic in nature. Many 
cooperatives provide education to their membership in the form of workshops, training, field 
days, and publications (Welch, 2001). Members benefit from gaining more knowledge of the 
industries in which they operate and the operational activities of the cooperative. In many ways, 
the communities in which the cooperatives operate also benefit from the cooperatives’ various 
activities.  Often times cooperatives provide jobs that would otherwise be absent and as such 
they increase community employment rates and ensure greater local economic health.  
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Furthermore, because most cooperatives are owned by local people, much of the revenue 
generated stays within the community and further fuels economic development (Welch, 2001). 
The local nature of the cooperative’s ownership creates a situation in which cooperatives are 
often more committed to the community than private corporations with foreign ownership and, 
as such, many cooperatives have an increased focus on sustainable community economic 
development (Welch, 2001; 5White, 2008).  
2.2 Success of the Cooperative Model 
Cooperatives typically enjoy significantly higher success rates than private corporations, 
with 46% of cooperatives surviving their first ten years and only 20% of private sector 
companies making it to the ten-year mark (Bond, Clement, Cournoyer, and Dupont, 2000). In 
general, cooperatives that form as a result of market failures are much more successful than those 
that are formed to address oversupply in the market (Fulton and Gibbings, 2000). Several studies 
have identified critical factors that contribute to the success of cooperatives. Welch (2001) 
identified seven different success factors that can greatly increase a coop’s chance of survival. 
The first of these is to ensure that both inside and outside expertise is used effectively. It is not 
only essential that coops trust and use the experience of people within the organization, but also 
that they seek the professional experience of external consultants. This is especially important 
during the planning and development phase when the fundamental research into the feasibility of 
the cooperative is occurring (Welch, 2001). The feasibility study and business plan form the two 
most essential documents of the fledgling cooperative. These documents are the first step in 
determining whether or not a cooperative has the potential to succeed and the issues it might face 
as it moves forward.  
Welch’s second key to success is to keep the cooperative’s members informed and 
involved. Failure to do so results in a situation in which members feel a lack of control and 
simply become resentful or disinterested in the process and this can lead to the break-up of the 
cooperative (Fulton and Gibbings 2000; Welch, 2001). This is linked to group cohesion, which 
Welch identified as another critical success factor. If the coop’s membership does not understand 
the goals of the cooperative it becomes difficult to remain committed to and involved in the 
cooperative. The maintenance of a strong relationship between the board and management is also 
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important as nothing can be accomplished if these two entities are not cooperating and working 
together to achieve the same goals (Welch, 2001).  
Welch also identified the conduction of professionally structured meetings as another 
important factor in the success of a cooperative. By conducting professionally structured 
meetings the group can remain more productive and will take the entire process a lot more 
seriously. Similarly, operating the business in a professional manner and following proper 
business practices is essential, particularly when dealing with the financial aspects of the coop. 
Failure to do this will only decrease the faith of the membership and prospective financiers of the 
cooperative. Lastly, Welch highlights the importance of linking with other cooperatives 
throughout the life of the cooperative. By drawing on the experiences of groups that have already 
been through the cooperative development process, new cooperatives can greatly decrease the 
chances of making common mistakes and reduce their information costs (Welch, 2001; White, 
2008d). 
Travers (2004) credits the success of the cooperative model to its unique ability to 
consolidate the experience, knowledge, and views of a large number of people. By harnessing 
the knowledge, skills and experience of a number of individuals the cooperative is stronger than 
a comparable private firm (Travers, 2004; Welch, 2001). Fulton and Gibbings (2000) attribute 
the success of cooperatives to the strength of the cooperative’s relationships. The three key 
relationships that Fulton and Gibbings identify are the relationships among members, the 
relationships among the activities the coop undertakes, and the relationship between members 
and the coop’s activities. They go on to state that the strongest relationships are those with the 
highest degrees of integration where the activities and elements in a relationship are highly 
connected and interdependent. Generally cooperatives with the highest degree of integration 
have the largest number of complementarities. The fact that a cooperative’s strength is 
determined by the strength of its relationships highlights the importance of governance and 
effective management (Fulton and Gibbings, 2000).  
Member commitment is another important factor that Fulton and Gibbings address, which 
Welch identifies as group cohesion. Tied to member commitment or group cohesion is member 
education. Successful cooperatives provide their members with educational opportunities 
pertaining to the industry in which the cooperative operates and the activities of the cooperative. 
By providing members with education, cooperative organizers can ensure that members maintain 
12 
 
their connection with the cooperative and continue to have common goals (Fulton and Gibbings, 
2000). 
2.3 Common Sources of Cooperative Failure 
Typically, cooperatives that fail were doomed from the start. Cooperatives are often 
formed in response to rapid economic change and crisis (Fulton and Stefanson, 1997; Gertler, 
2004). This causes cooperative organizers to rush through the development in hopes of finding a 
quick fix to the problems that they are facing. As a result they often neglect to achieve or 
consider one or more of the factors that are crucial to their success. Perhaps the most common 
pitfall is a lack of appropriate planning (Welch, 2001). The development of feasibility studies 
and business plans involve a substantial amount of research, which in turn involves a significant 
time investment. High quality, well-researched feasibility studies and business plans are priceless 
as they are the cooperatives’ first line of defence in identifying potential problems that lead to 
failure. When cooperative organizers rush through the development process and cut corners on 
research into the feasibility of the project the risk of all involved losing their investment is 
greatly increased.  In addition, when the financial research that is usually conducted in the 
feasibility study and business plan is neglected, it is highly likely that the cooperative will have 
financing problems (Welch, 2001).  
Furthermore, the lack of a well-designed business plan can create a situation in which the 
cooperative lacks direction and organization. This can result in the cooperative wasting a large 
amount of time and initial operating capital trying to figure out where it is going and what it is 
doing. In addition, the absence of a well-developed business plan that members support and 
understand can create a situation in which each member has their own idea of where the 
cooperative is going (Welch, 2001). Without a predetermined set of commonly agreed upon 
goals the members cannot even begin to cooperate and work together for the betterment of the 
cooperative (Fulton and Gibbings, 2000; Welch, 2001). 
Another common problem that cooperatives face is a lack of effective leadership. This 
applies to both leadership within the cooperative’s management and the cooperative’s 
membership (Fulton and Gibbings, 2000; Welch, 2001). Poor financial management can 
eventually lead to bankruptcy and poor operational management can result in failure to meet 
production targets and business commitments. Ineffective relationship management can cause 
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deterioration of business relationships and lead to conflicts between management and the board 
of directors. All of these issues have the potential to greatly inhibit the cooperative’s ability to 
function and succeed. Ineffective leadership, including that of the board of directors, can also 
represent a significant handicap for cooperatives; this is especially true as the cooperative ages 
resulting in a tendency for increasing heterogeneity in both the composition and goals of the 
cooperative’s membership (Fulton and Gibbings, 2000). Managers that cannot effectively 
mobilize members and facilitate constructive communication within the membership make it 
increasingly difficult for the cooperative to meet the needs of the membership (Fulton and 
Gibbings, 2000; Welch, 2001). When this occurs, members who begin to feel isolated and 
become disenchanted with the cooperative and the value that it provides to them. As a result 
many of these members begin leaving, and if left unchecked, can lead to a complete breakdown 
of the cooperative.  
The fact that the value of the cooperative’s membership shares are not tied to the level of 
equity within the cooperative presents another interesting problem for companies employing the 
cooperative model. In a private firm, shareholders’ shares have a value that is based on the assets 
and financial success of the cooperative. As such, when shareholders wish to exit the 
organization they are able to recoup their initial investment and any appreciation in the share 
value by selling them. This is not the case in the general cooperative model as the cooperative 
owns the assets and member shares do not entitle the holder to a portion of those assets; member 
shares have no significant value and members are not able to recoup the appreciation in value 
their equity investment provides to the cooperative. This presents a problem for older 
cooperatives with an aging membership as members who know they will be exiting the 
cooperative soon and will no longer enjoy the benefits it provides have little incentive to make 
equity investments in the firm. This can make it difficult for the cooperative to expand or replace 
aging capital without attracting new younger members.  
2.4 Relevant Cooperative Types 
2.4.1 Forestry Cooperatives 
Forestry cooperatives can be broadly defined as any business that operates in the forestry 
sector and employs the basic principles and structure of the cooperative model (White, 2008c). 
Existing and previously existing forestry cooperatives have engaged in a variety of forestry 
14 
 
related activities including forest management, fibre harvesting, forest product production, forest 
product marketing, and sustainability certification (Gertler, 2004; Karg, 2000; White, 2008c). 
Membership of forestry cooperatives ranges from producers to workers to entire forestry-
dependent communities (White, 2008c). The objectives of the various types of forestry 
cooperatives reflect the goals and views of the cooperative’s members. The four main groups of 
forestry cooperatives are worker-owned, community-owned, woodlot/private landowner, and 
producer-owned. All of these cooperative models provide members and their communities with 
the same basic benefits provided by the cooperative model; but in addition, each of them offers a 
subset of benefits that are unique from the others.  While there are advantages of each of the four 
classes of forestry cooperatives, I will focus on the producer cooperative given its applicability to 
the independent operators in Saskatchewan.  
2.4.2 Producer Cooperatives 
Producer-owned cooperatives are formed by individuals and companies that produce 
similar commodities and products to provide economic benefits (MacPherson, 2003). Although 
there are some producer cooperatives operating in the forestry sector, the majority of producer 
cooperatives operate in the agricultural sector. While the two sectors are different, there are 
enough similarities to warrant investigation. 
The first, and most obvious similarity exists in the type of products and markets that 
forest products and agricultural products are sold in. Both sectors produce commodities that are 
heavily exported into a competitive global marketplace that demands lower prices and stronger 
product differentiation. Second, both sectors have producers with production volumes that vary 
from the large production volumes of large corporately owned and integrated farms and lumber 
mills to the substantially lower production volumes of small family farms and small independent 
saw mills. Smaller producers in agriculture and forestry face the problems of comparatively 
higher cost structures and the lack of access to professional services and technology that are 
associated with a lack of economies of scale, thus making it increasingly difficult for them to 
compete in a global marketplace. Last, both industries require capital equipment, diesel fuel, 
labour, and large levels of operating capital to bridge the gap between investment in inputs and 
the receipt of revenues from finished products. Next, I will explore three types of organization: 
supply, marketing and new generation cooperatives. 
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2.4.3 Supply Cooperatives 
The function of a supply cooperative is strictly to provide economic benefits to its 
members through the creation of economies of scale in the purchasing of necessary goods and 
services. The economies of scale are created through joint purchasing of a large volume of 
homogenous goods that all of the members require. This gives the cooperative volume buying 
power and allows them to negotiate lower prices (MacPherson, 2003; White, 2008e). The 
benefits that accrue as a result of the cooperative’s volume buying power are conferred to the 
members in the form of lower prices at the point of purchase or through the issuance of 
dividends at yearend. The membership usually consists of a group of producers who are 
operating in the same industry and producing similar products using similar inputs; this is 
essential in ensuring that the group achieves optimal purchasing power for all of the goods they 
provide to their members and that the cooperative has a common objective. Supply cooperatives 
follow the traditional cooperative model in terms of employing the one-member one-vote 
system, as well as a member-elected board of directors. In most cases, they will hire a 
cooperative manager and any additional employees who might be required to negotiate prices 
with vendors and complete sales contracts. 
Supply cooperatives are most common in agriculture where supply cooperatives play an 
important role in providing small-scale agriculture operations with access to lower-priced farm 
inputs such as fuel, fertilizer, feed, and seed (Macpherson, 2003; McMartin, 2007). In 2004, 
there were 219 supply cooperatives operating in Canada, which collectively generated total 
revenues of $4.4 billion of which $1.98 billion (45%) was generated from the sale of farm 
petroleum, $1.01 billion (23%) was generated from the sale of fertilizer, $620 million (14%) was 
generated from the sale of feed, and the remaining $790 million (18%) was generated from the 
sale of other farm inputs (McMartin, 2007). An example of a successful agriculture supply 
cooperative in Saskatchewan is Federated Cooperatives Ltd., which operates agriculture supply 
stores in a number of Saskatchewan cities and towns. In this cooperative, the benefits of volume 
purchasing are distributed to members through the issuance of patronage dividends that are 
positively correlated to the total dollar value of the member’s purchases. 
There were no examples of forestry cooperatives that could be classified strictly as a 
supply cooperative. Instead it seems that the functions of a supply cooperative are integrated as a 
secondary function into the mandate of other types of forestry cooperatives. Examples of this 
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include the Athol Cooperative retail store, which provides forestry-related supplies to the 
members of the Athol cooperative. In this example, the volume buying benefits of the aggregated 
forestry supply purchases are distributed to Athol’s members through lower prices at the point of 
purchase (Anonymous, 2009a; Anonymous, 2009b).  
2.4.4 Marketing Cooperatives 
  The role of a marketing cooperative is to market the products produced by its members 
into existing markets and also to develop new markets (MacPherson, 2003). Usually the 
marketing cooperative is responsible for the sale and pricing of cooperative members’ entire 
production volumes. By aggregating production into a larger marketable volume, the marketing 
cooperative is able to create economies of scale. For example, a timber marketing office could 
market 40,000 cubic metres of fibre just as easily as it could market 10,000 cubic metres of fibre 
without incurring additional costs. Furthermore, the collective marketing of a substantially larger 
volume could provide producers with increased market power and allow for the negotiation of 
higher sales prices (MacPherson, 2003). By entrusting the marketing of products to professionals 
hired by the cooperative, producers are able to place more focus on production and the 
operational aspects of their businesses.   
Agricultural marketing co-operatives are among the most successful of the producer 
cooperatives operating in Canada (McMartin, 2007). In 2004, Canada’s agricultural marketing 
cooperatives generated $7.7 billion in revenues. The most notable agricultural marketing 
cooperatives in western Canada were the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, which marketed grain and 
oilseed for Saskatchewan’s grain farmers, and Lilydale, which processes and markets poultry 
products for Saskatchewan’s poultry producers (Fulton and Herman, 2001; MacPherson, 2003; 
McMartin, 2007). There were no revenue data for Canadian forestry marketing cooperatives, 
likely because most are integrated with other types of forestry cooperatives. Examples of forestry 
cooperatives that have integrated marketing functions into their businesses are the Koocanusa 
Value Added Cooperative, the Athol Forestry Cooperative and Upper Canada Woods 
Cooperative (Anonymous, 2007a; Anonymous, 2009b; Anonymous, 2008a; Kinnis and Smith, 
2003).  
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2.4.5 New Generation Cooperatives 
The new generation cooperative (NGC) model is the most recent cooperative model to 
emerge and includes one example in the forest sector: the Kookanusa Value Added Cooperative 
(KVAC). The basic goal of an NGC is to provide value-added processing and to market such 
products. By adding value to inputs that might otherwise be sold into commodity markets, the 
NGC is able to extract an additional level of profit (Gillis, 2008; Haaf and Stefanson, 2001; 
MacPherson, 2003; Welch, 2001). Profits in turn, are redistributed to producers in the form of 
patronage dividends (Gillis, 2008; Kinnis and Smith, 2003). In many cases, NGCs add value to 
products through additional capital and technology to further differentiate products. In other 
cases, NGC’s provide members with access to new capital and technology to create new 
products (Gillis, 2008). In almost all cases the producers would not have been able to 
independently access technology or capital because they lacked sufficient production volumes to 
warrant the large capital investment or because they would not have been able to secure the 
required financing. The formation of a new generation cooperative can solve these problems by 
pooling resources and creating economies of scale that make large investments feasible. Pooling 
resources also allows NGCs to better access financing as banks are often more likely to lend to a 
cooperative than an independent rural producer (Kinnis and Smith, 2003).  
In addition to ensuring that members receive equitable returns on pooled resources, the 
NGC’s unique share structure can also provide additional opportunities for the procurement of 
finances for capital investment. There are three share classes in the typical NGC model. 
Membership shares are similar to those in all other cooperative models in that those possessing 
membership shares are given the right to vote in board elections and cooperative decisions. 
NGCs operate under the one-member one-vote system and there is no ability for larger producers 
within the membership to exert control. In the NGC model, membership shares also provide the 
shareholder with the right to purchase equity shares, also known as delivery shares (Fulton and 
Stefanson, 2007; Haaf and Stefanson, 2001). Equity shares or delivery shares are used as a 
means of generating start-up capital for the cooperative and as a method of assigning commodity 
delivery rights to the producers. One equity (delivery) share provides the shareholder with the 
right to deliver one unit of a commodity input to the NGC (i.e. one bushel of wheat, one cubic 
metre of pulp wood, etc.). Delivery rights carry with them the obligation for shareholders to 
deliver to the cooperative the exact quantity and quality of the commodity for which they hold 
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delivery rights. This ensures that the cooperative will always have a sufficient quality and 
quantity of inputs to meet production targets. Similarly, the cooperative has an obligation to 
accept and pay for the exact quantity of a commodity for which a shareholder possesses delivery 
rights (Fulton and Stefanson, 2007; Haaf and Stefanson, 2001; Kinnis and Smith, 2003). This 
provides added security for producers and ensures that they will always be able to reap the 
benefits of their equity investment. Membership shares, and thus equity shares, are only provided 
to producers to ensure that producers maintain control of the cooperative and to ensure that only 
product belonging to the producer members is used by the NGC. Producers who hold equity 
shares are generally able to transfer or sell their shares, with approval of the board of directors, to 
existing equity shareholders or individuals who purchase the assets of the shareholder (Haaf and 
Stefanson, 2001). This ensures that equity shares possess a value and that shareholders can 
recover their equity investment when they choose to exit the industry or to leave the cooperative. 
The equity share system used by the NGCs has proven to be successful at generating 
substantial levels of start-up capital.  At the same time, the system provides members with 
security and a guaranteed return on their investment. When the North American Bison 
Cooperative was incorporated it initially sold 180 US$100 membership shares to members who 
then purchased a minimum of ten US$250 equity shares each. As a result the cooperative was 
able to generate enough cash flow to cover almost 50% of their start-up costs. Since NGCs are 
often able to generate such a large level of initial cash flow through the sale of equity (delivery) 
shares, they often have much lower initial debt loads than companies in comparable industries 
that use one of the other cooperative models (Haaf and Stefanson, 2001). In addition, the 
increased level of investment by members can induce member commitment to be stronger than 
for other cooperative models; this can result in a higher success rate as member commitment has 
been identified as one of the keys to a cooperative’s success (Fulton and Gibbings, 2000; Fulton 
and Stefanson, 2007; Haaf and Stefanson, 2001; Welch, 2001). In addition to equity shares, 
NGCs also use preferred shares as a means of generating sufficient start up and operating capital. 
Preferred shares allow the cooperative to generate additional capital investment from both 
producers and non-producers. Preferred shareholders hold no voting rights or delivery rights and 
generally offer a fixed rate of return on their investment. In many cases preferred shares are sold 
to community development organizations and other parties who have an interest in supporting 
the community and economic development that NGCs can provide (Haaf and Stefanson, 2001). 
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Banks or other financial lenders who have provided loans to the cooperative may also hold 
preferred shares as a means of ensuring legal security to the cooperative’s assets during the term 
of the loan.  
2.6 Forest Tenure in Saskatchewan 
There are three types of forest tenure instruments that are currently employed in 
Saskatchewan: Forest Management Agreements (FMAs), Term Supply Licences (TSLs), and 
Forest Product Permits (FPPs). 
FMAs are 20 year tenure agreements formed between the provincial government and 
large forest producers that operate large pulp and paper mills or sawmill within the Province. In 
addition, to providing the longest forest tenure duration available in the province, they also 
provide firms with the greatest degree of fibre supply security. FMAs provide the agreement 
holder with long-term harvesting rights throughout a certain tract of land contained within the 
borders of the FMA. These agreements have the advantage of providing the longest tenure 
duration available to forest producers but carry onerous and often expensive forest planning and 
management costs. There are currently five FMAs in Saskatchewan’s commercial forest area. 
The IOs within this study operate in the Prince Albert Forest Management Agreement area 
(PAFMA) and the Island Forest Management Agreement Area. The geographical area 
encompassed by the FMAs is shown in Figure 2.1. All IO mills related to this study are 
contained within the red border in Figure 2.1.  
TSLs are medium range tenure instruments that cover periods of five to ten years and 
provide firms with an intermediate level of fibre security. TSLs provide their holder with the 
right to harvest a specified quantity of timber annually from a pre-defined geographical area. 
These tenure instruments allow producers to hold tenure over a longer period of time than Forest 
Product Permits and carry less onerous forest management and planning obligations than FMAs. 
Historically, TSLs were typically granted to firms with medium to large fibre allocations that 
operated sawmills throughout the province. In northern areas of the province TSLs have been 
assigned to areas not covered by an FMA but in the more southerly portions of the commercial 
forest TSLs are often granted within the boundaries of an existing FMA. More recently, the 
government has made TSLs available to IOs with relatively small allocations whom, in the past, 
would only have been granted annual Forest Product Permits.  
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Figure 2.1: Saskatchewan FMA Map 
 
Source: Government of Saskatchewan, 2013. 
 
Despite this, most IOs continue to be granted their allocations through Forest Product 
Permits (FPPs). These tenure instruments have an extremely short duration, granting their holder 
an allocation within a specific FMA for a period of one year. FPPs also confer their holder with 
the least degree of legal security to the timber supply, as technically, the government could 
simply choose not to renew them upon application. For the most part, this does not happen and 
the crown and IOs operate under a gentleman’s agreement promising annual renewal in 
perpetuity. In addition to having the lowest level of tenure security, FPPs are also the most 
inflexible form of tenure available in Saskatchewan’s forest management system. Generally, 
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FPPs require that their holder file an annual operating plan that targets specific timber blocks 
within a predefined operating area. The chosen timber blocks within the plan contain a volume of 
timber which equates to the annual allowable cut of IOs. For IOs, these volumes range from 
approximately 500 m3 to 20,000 m 3.  
It is important to note that in each FMA there are a large number of FPP and TSL 
holders, of whom the majority are IOs, that are granted timber harvesting rights across the large 
geographical area encompassed by the FMA. The FPP and TSL holders operating within FMAs 
are not assigned to specific timber stands or areas within the FMA but are instead able to target 
stands throughout the entire FMA. This creates a situation in which IOs have overlapping fibre 
procurement activities and this has driven competition among IOs. 
2.5 Conclusions 
There are several examples of forestry cooperatives that have been successful in creating 
both economic and non-economic benefits for their members. The literature on agricultural 
producer cooperatives provides many examples of groups with characteristics similar to the IOs. 
Although none of the cooperatives identified provided producers with the same mix of services 
as those required by the IOs, the literature did provide insight into how the NGC model could be 
used to provide sufficient flexibility and to meet the unique needs of IOs. While the model’s 
application in the forest sector has been rather limited, the structural and operational flexibility 
inherent in the NGC model and its history of successful application in the agricultural sector 
provide a strong basis for its use in the reorganization of Saskatchewan’s IOs.   
The current tenure regime in Saskatchewan provides IOs with a rather low level of tenure 
security. Moreover, the current system does not provide IOs with any degree of exclusivity in 
their harvesting rights. This has led to IOs overlapping forest procurement activities and 
competing with one another instead of coordinating their activities and benefiting from 
economies of scope. The cooperative model has the potential to resolve some of the inefficiency 
created by the current tenure regime through the coordination of fibre procurement activities and 
reduction of competition among IOs. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
 
3.0 Introduction 
A qualitative approach was used to gather background information pertaining to IOs and 
their economic challenges. During October of 2009, personal interviews were conducted with the 
executive director of the Independent Forest Operators of Saskatchewan and the president of the 
Independent Operators of Saskatchewan. An open interview style was used to ensure that all 
details were captured. Information obtained from those interviews was then used to develop a 
listing of the major challenges that the IOs face and subsequently, to frame the problem. A 
follow-up interview was conducted with the president of the IOs in the fall of 2012 to validate 
information obtained from the first interview and to track changes. 
To address the challenges IOs are facing, the adopted IO cooperative model must be able 
to: (i) increase competitiveness, (ii) increase access to fibre, and (iii) increase access to capital 
including human capital such as forestry professionals. This chapter begins with a detailed 
discussion of the share and organizational structure that could be employed by the IO 
cooperative.  Additionally, I used economic analysis and a case study approach to compare 
economies of scope under two operating frameworks – business as usual using the financial 
information gathered during the interviews, and the proposed NGC framework.  Details of the 
approach are included below. 
3.1 Analytical Methodology 
A comparative economic analysis was used to compare total fibre procurement costs of 
the business as usual case and the NGC case. The comparative economic analysis was chosen for 
its efficiency and ability to clearly illustrate variations in potential net economic benefits under 
both scenarios. Given that this study is focused on determining whether the cooperative model 
can generate economic benefits, the proposed cooperative’s primary function as a raw wood 
supplier, and the high contribution margin of fibre procurement cost to the IO’s overall cost 
structure, it was determined that fibre procurement costs would be compared. More specifically, 
since it has been proposed that restructuring the IOs under an NGC model might create 
economies of scope, the comparative analysis focuses on average fibre procurement costs. 
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The average fibre procurement cost function is derived by dividing each of the fibre 
processing cost functions by Qj, where Qj is the quantity of fibre processed. For the purposes of 
this study, it can be assumed that the same quantity of fibre is processed in all of the activities 
that make up the fibre procurement process. As such, average costs can also be obtained by 
dividing total fibre procurement costs by Qj.  Economies of scope are deemed to be present when 
the average cost of production decreases as the quantity of multiple outputs increase (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 2004). As such, if average fibre procurement costs are shown to be lower in the 
counterfactual model than those seen in the factual model, economies of scope are present.  
3.2 Case Study Methodology 
In order to compare total fibre procurements costs and the resulting average fibre 
procurement costs, a significant amount of highly-detailed quantitative and qualitative data is 
required. Given the limited availability of data, it was determined that employing a case study 
methodology to gather data from the IOs themselves would provide the detailed qualitative and 
quantitative data necessary to conduct a comparative economic analysis.  
The case study methodology has been widely used in the social sciences since the early 
1900s (Tellis, 1997; Johansson, 2003). The methodology is most useful when a comprehensive, 
multi-faceted investigation is required (Feagin et al. 1991). The methodology’s usefulness stems 
from the fact that it incorporates a number of research methods with the aim of triangulating 
detailed case data (Johansson, 2003). Case studies often focus on an individual, single 
organization, or group and are designed to elicit highly detailed information pertaining to the 
participant; this is accomplished through the use of multiple sources of data or evidence (Tellis, 
1997). 
3.3 Case Study Development 
Following the steps identified in Soy (1997), development of the IO case study began 
with identification of qualitative and quantitative research questions. The questions identified 
under this step were as follows: 
1. What are the steps involved in the fibre procurement process? 
2. What are the labour, capital, and raw input requirements associated with each of the 
steps? 
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3. What are the costs associated with the required labour, capital, and raw inputs? 
  While the first question is largely qualitative, the second question has both quantitative 
and qualitative elements. The third question is almost purely quantitative in nature. 
Direct observation of fibre procurement activities at the selected IO mill site ensured that 
the full scope of fibre procurement activities was obtained. Further detail regarding fibre 
activities was obtained through the review of procedural manuals and company documentation 
specific to the fibre procurement process. Last, archived production and financial records were 
used to verify financial and productivity data.  
The final step was the development of the selection criteria that was used to select IO 
mills on which the case study would be based. It was decided that when choosing the IO firms, 
preference would be given to IO firms that were: intermediate in size relative to all other IOs, 
situated in a geographical location central to all other IO mills, willing to disclose three years of 
financial data, willing to have detailed discussions regarding operational processes, and had raw 
wood fibre size requirements that were intermediate to the size requirements of all other IOs.  
It is important to note that the data analyzed within were limited to costs, effectively 
ignoring output price in the analysis. The justification for this is two-fold. Given the small size of 
IOs and the fact that many are producing similar products, for which there are in many cases 
substitutes, into similar, developed, competitive markets, it is reasonable to assume that the firms 
have little influence over prices and are price takers. In addition, given that the current proposed 
cooperative structure will not introduce cooperative marketing or output pricing elements, it is 
also reasonable to assume that the formation of the IO NGC will not have any effect on the 
producer’s position as price takers. Consequently, while over the long-term output prices have 
effects on the viability of individual firms belonging to the cooperative, they will have no direct 
effect on the operational costs of the cooperative and thus, the feasibility of such a venture. 
3.4 Independent Operator Data  
A total of six IOs producing a variety of products with varying fibre needs expressed a 
willingness to participate in the study and to provide financial and operational data. A listing of 
the required financial and operational data was distributed to six participants, of which, one 
replied. Potential participants that did not respond were contacted a second time and, once again, 
no response was received. The IO that responded, Vermette Wood Products Ltd, was measured 
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against the primary selection criteria developed for this case study. All of the required criteria 
were satisfied in full. First, the company is a medium sized IO firm operating a fence post mill 
near Spruce Home, SK in the rural municipality of Buckland (an area central to the geographic 
location of other IO mills). The company produces fence posts in a variety of sizes and utilizes 
medium sized wood fibre in their production process. In addition to satisfying these criteria, 
Vermette Wood Products was willing to provide all the required case evidence including 
documentation, historical financial and production records, interviews, and direct observation. 
Data obtained from the interviews and direct observations revealed that the fibre 
procurement process employed by Vermette Wood Products Ltd., and all other IOs, has five 
distinct steps: forest management and planning, licencing, harvesting, scaling, and hauling 
(Klyne, 2009; Vermette, 2009). Within each of these steps there are a number of cost generating 
activities that occur. Forest management and planning involves all aspects of pre-harvest 
planning including: forest inventory analysis, harvest block/stand selection, and harvest planning 
and mapping. The licencing process includes activities related to forest licencing and permitting, 
and transportation licencing and permitting. The harvesting process is rather simple and relies on 
contracted loggers who harvest the stand as per the company’s harvest plan and product 
specifications. These same contractors are generally contracted to conduct the in-block road 
building activities necessary to access timber. Once harvesting is complete, a scaling contractor 
is hired to scale the harvested timber and assess the crown dues and fees owing to the 
government. After the mandatory waiting period has passed, scaled timber is hauled to the mill 
site by the harvesting contractor. In the case of Vermette Wood Products Ltd., harvested timber 
is delivered in predetermined lengths of six to twelve feet. At the point of delivery, timber is 
deemed ready for value added processing and the fibre procurement process is complete 
(Vermette, 2009). 
The quantitative data that was received from Vermette Wood Products Ltd. covered a 
three-year period. It consisted of complete financial and operational data for the years requested 
as well as continued access to detailed digital data including the corporation’s general ledger and 
provincial wood-flow reporting databases. The high data quality allowed for a greater degree of 
detail in the development of the model and should, by effect, increase the accuracy of the model 
results. The data obtained through the case study are directly employed in the estimation of fibre 
procurement costs. The use of single source data in the estimation of IO fibre procurement costs 
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has been deemed acceptable given that it is unlikely that any IO has production volumes that 
would allow for any degree of market power. Moreover, they operate in the same geographical 
market area increasing the likelihood that they face identical input prices. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on the development of the fibre procurement cost models. The 
results of the case study and the description of the fibre procurement process are used to 
construct a cost model for the factual case in which IOs procure fibre independently. Next, the 
results of the case study, literature review, interviews with IFOS members, and interviews with 
Ontario IOs are used to create a detailed operational framework for the IO NGC. Finally, the 
counterfactual fibre cost model is developed based on the IO NGC operational framework and 
the NGC structure presented in Chapter Two. The two models are then compared in chapter five. 
4.1 Business as Usual 
Currently, IOs engage in a minimal level of cooperation. The small amount of 
cooperation that occurs is generally limited to involvement in the Independent Forest Operators 
of Saskatchewan, the lobbying group that represents the concerns of IOs in dealings with larger 
industry operators and government. In reality, most IOs do not compete in output markets, but 
instead sell their products into specialized, niche, or distant markets where their primary 
competitors are from western Canada and the United States (Vermette, 2009). Furthermore, 
while IOs share the same input markets, the volume of inputs demanded is relatively low and 
competition for inputs is weak. 
For the most part, IOs follow the same basic fibre procurement process and face the same 
fibre procurement cost structure. The first step for IOs is to find an adequate quantity and quality 
of required wood within the prescribed forest management area. The associated costs are called 
“forest inventory costs.” Where larger firms traditionally use professional services, the have low 
allocation volumes that do not allow them to regularly employ such individuals. Instead, IOs 
often rely on internal experience.  
Once timber is selected for harvest, each IO must prepare harvesting and scaling plans 
that are then reviewed and accepted by the province’s Ministry of Environment. During the 
review process, the IO and a provincial forester meet to discuss the plans in greater detail and to 
negotiate conditions associated with plan approvals. Upon approval of the harvesting and scaling 
plans, IOs apply to the Saskatchewan Ministry of Highways and Transportation for log hauling 
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permits, overweight permits, and partnership whereby they  are generally required to pay a per 
tonne highway tax for all fibre being hauled on provincial roads. These permits are negotiated for 
each IO on an individual basis and the Ministry of Highways and Transportation staff.  
The next step is timber harvesting. While some IOs conduct their own small scale 
harvesting operations, the majority of the IO timber allocation is harvested by logging 
contractors. Often, IOs experience difficulties securing long term contractors given their 
relatively small individual harvest volumes that result in higher mobilization costs (on a per unit 
basis) than the higher volume contracts offered by larger mills. IOs who harvest their own timber 
are equally disadvantaged as a result of the high capital costs associated with harvesting 
equipment and their relatively small allocation volumes. 
Once fibre is harvested it is measured and the amount of crown dues and reforestation 
fees owed for that volume are assessed (a process known as scaling). After timber is scaled it is 
hauled via semi-trailers to the respective IO mill where it is processed. At this point, the fibre 
procurement process is complete.  
 In order to develop a model that can be applied to all IOs, it is important to make general 
assumptions about economic, behavioural, and operational characteristics:  
1. IOs are price takers and hold no market power. 
2. Firms are profit maximizing. 
3. Firms are rational. 
4. Inflation is assumed at 2% per annum. 
5. All IO’s harvest locations are located at an equal distance from their primary mill site. 
6. The absence of sufficient residual volumes does not allow for the sale of individual IO 
residual fibre to existing pulp and hog fuel markets. 
7. Residual fibre cost recovery is not possible for IO mills in the current situation. 
4.2 The Factual Fibre Procurement Cost Model 
Nine cost components were identified in the fibre procurement process including that for: 
forest inventory, dues and fees, forest licencing, transportation licencing, harvesting, scaling, 
highway taxes, road building, and administration. Total fibre procurement costs are expressed as 
the summation of all costs (shown in equation 4.1). 
TCf = Ci + Cd + Cl + Ct + Ch + Cs + Cx + Cr + Ca      (4.1) 
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Where total costs are composed of,  
Ci = Forest Inventory  
Cd = Dues and Fees  
Cl = Forest Licencing  
Ct = Transportation Licencing  
Ch = Harvesting and Hauling  
Cs = Scaling  
Cx = Highway Taxes 
Cr = Roads  
Ca = Administration 
Qn = Volume of Fibre Harvested in year n 
Forest licencing costs (Cl) and transportation licencing costs (Ct) can be viewed as fixed 
costs. Harvesting and hauling costs (Ch), scaling costs (Cs), highway taxes (Cx) and dues and fees 
(Cd), are variable and are incurred on a per-cubic-metre harvested basis.  
In order to effectively compare fibre procurement costs and to determine whether 
economies of scope are present, total fibre procurement costs must be broken down and 
expressed as average fibre procurement costs. The unit of measure under the average fibre 
procurement cost is the cost per cubic metre harvested. This is calculated by dividing total fibre 
procurement cost by the total volume of fibre harvest within the period (in cubic metres). The 
calculation for average cost is expressed in equation 4.2. 
ACf = TCf/Qn           (4.2) 
During the course of the case study, it was revealed that a significant portion of the fibre 
harvested is unsuitable for the IOs’ production processes. This unutilized residual fibre presents 
IOs with an interesting challenge in that there are currently no established markets in which the 
fibre can be sold. As such, cost recovery opportunities on residual fibre are non-existent and the 
residual fibre generated in the procurement process can be a significant cost. In order to present 
an accurate picture of average fibre procurement costs, this waste component must be considered 
by estimating the effective fibre procurement cost, which is calculated by dividing the average 
fibre procurement cost by the utilization rate for the fibre harvested in that period (equation 4.3).  
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ACef = ACf/U           (4.3) 
where U is the utilization rate, which is the percentage of total fibre that can be utilized in the IO 
production process and is not classified as waste.  
4.2.1 Forest Inventory Costs 
For modelling purposes it is assumed that all of the IOs have equal annual allowable cuts, 
invest equal amounts in timber cruising, budget equal amounts to the same harvesting activities 
and have equal feasibility and utilization standards. The assumption that IOs have similar cost 
structures is further supported by the fact that these competitive firms sell their products for 
similar prices in competing markets, compete for inputs in a small local market, operate similar 
sized mills in the same geographical area, and employ approximately the same level of 
technology in their operations.  The basic total cost model for timber cruising is a function of 
labour costs, aerial survey costs, equipment costs, travel costs, and research camp costs. The total 
forest inventory cost includes all timber cruising costs and is given by: 
Cf = xl*wl + xa*wa + xt*wt + k + r        (4.4) 
where, 
xl = number of labour hours spent on forest inventory analysis 
wl =forester wage rate 
 xa =number of hours in aircraft 
wa =cost per hour for aircraft  
xt =number of km travelled 
wt =cost per km of travel 
k =timber cruising equipment costs 
r =research camp costs 
4.2.2 Forest and Transport Licencing Costs 
In order to ensure that forest licencing and transport licencing costs are directly 
comparable, we must also operate under the assumption that all IOs follow the same forest 
licencing process. Costs are calculated in the following equations: 
Cl = wl*xd + wm*xn + wl*xr + wl*xe       (4.5) 
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where, 
wl = foresters’ wage rate 
xd = labour hours spent developing annual operating plan 
wm = upper management/owner wage rate 
xn = labour hours spent negotiating forest licencing agreement 
xr = labour hours spent conducting reporting activities for forest licencing agreement 
xe = labour hours spent engaging in related enforcement activities 
Forest licencing costs are independent of harvest volumes and, as such, represent a fixed 
cost. This reinforces the assumption that IOs face similar cost structures as illustrates that 
variance in IO fibre volume allocations will have no effect on forest licencing costs. Similarly, 
the costs associated with transportation licencing are not affected by variances in harvest 
volumes and represent a fixed cost.  Regardless of the volume harvested, this transaction cost 
will remain relatively stationary, as the level of effort expended on transportation licencing does 
not change based on volume. The transportation licencing cost is illustrated in equation 4.6 
below. 
Ct = wl*xp + wm*xnp + wl*xrp        (4.6) 
where, 
wl = forester wage rate 
xp = labour hours spent developing and reviewing transportation partnership agreement 
wm = upper management/owner wage rate 
xnp = labour hours spent negotiating transportation partnership agreement 
xrp = labour hours spent engaging in reporting activities for partnership agreement  
4.2.3 Highway Tax Cost 
Highway taxes are variable and change in direct proportion to the volume of timber 
hauled. In order to model these cost we assume that IOs face a similar cost structure. Finally, it 
must be assumed that the volume harvested is equal to the volume hauled, that is, all timber must 
leave the forest in the same period in which it was harvested. This assumption is not entirely 
essential for prior periods where we have hauling data but it is essential for forecasting future 
periods using the model. The following equation expresses highway taxes in a given year: 
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Cx = th*Qn           (4.7) 
where, 
th = Highway tax rate for a given year (in $/m
3) 
Qn = Volume of fibre harvested in given year (in m
3) 
4.2.4 Harvesting Costs 
In the factual model, harvesting costs make up the largest portion of IO fibre procurement 
costs. Harvesting costs are variable and change in direct proportion to the volume of fibre 
harvested. Larger IOs contract fibre-harvesting activities to logging contractors while the smaller 
IOs engage in small-scale harvesting operations using small-sized equipment.  Following 
discussions with the sample IO and IFOS, it was discovered that IOs accept their fibre in a 
variety of forms and that the form of delivered fibre changes based on the equipment operated by 
the logging contractor and mill processing capacity. While some mills have contractors who run 
harvesting operations that are suited to the production of tree-length fibre others have contractors 
who run cut-to-length harvesting operations. In a tree-length operation, contractors deliver fibre 
to the mill in tree-length form and the mill uses a slasher or buckers to cut the fibre into the 
desired lengths. Whereas in a cut-to-length operation, contractors use a processor to cut the fibre 
to the desired lengths during the harvesting process and deliver fibre to the mills in cut-to-length 
form.  
In the latter case, contractors charge higher rates as they engage in a higher level of 
processing than if they were delivering tree length logs to the mill. However, the mills’ 
processing costs are lower as they do not need to expend additional effort to get fibre cut to the 
desired length. This type of harvesting is exemplified in the first part of the harvesting cost 
equation. The second part of the harvesting cost equation illustrates the cost of receiving fibre in 
tree-length form. In that situation, contractors charge a lower rate but the mill must engage in a 
higher level of processing to get fibre to the desired length, and thus the mills’ processing costs 
are higher in a tree-length operation. In some cases, mills receive fibre in both forms. The factual 
model harvesting cost equation shown below incorporates this reality and provides a flexible 
representation of IO fibre harvesting costs. 
Ch = hc*Qnc + ht*Qnt + st* Qnt          (4.8) 
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where, 
ht = tree-length harvesting rate paid to contractors (in $/m
3) 
hc = cut to length harvesting rate paid to contractors (in $/m
3) 
st = slashing/bucking cost (in $/m
3) 
Qnt = Volume of Fibre Harvested in Given Year as tree-length (in m
3) 
Qnc = Volume harvest in given year as cut to length (in m
3) 
and, 
 Qnt + Qnc = Qn 
4.2.5 Crown Dues and Reforestation Fees 
 Similar to harvesting costs, crown dues and reforestation fees are variable and are based 
on the volume of wood harvested. Crown dues are timber royalties charged by the government 
for every cubic metre of timber harvested. Rates are calculated on a quarterly basis by the Forest 
Service and are based on a formula, which considers market prices, operating costs, etc. in 
determination of the acceptable royalty for that type of timber. Since the IOs are focused only on 
harvested softwood timber, we only have two crown due rates to incorporate: the S1 rate (for 
timber with a diameter greater than 6 inches) and the S2 rate (for timber with a diameter less than 
6 inches). Given that the cost of crown dues is the volume of each size class harvested multiplied 
by the respective crown dues rate, one could easily incorporate additional variables to reflect the 
harvesting of various types of timber with varying dues rates. 
Reforestation fees are calculated in a manner similar to crown dues. The major difference 
is that there is generally only one reforestation rate applied to all timber harvested regardless of 
size. Another key difference is that unlike crown dues, which carry the same monetary obligation 
province wide, reforestation fees vary by FMA. Fees are calculated by the FMA holder who is 
generally responsible for all reforestation activities and are meant to reflect the actual cost of 
reforestation in the FMA.  
Many IOs hold allocations in multiple FMAs and, as such, it was necessary to reflect this 
reality in the calculations. This was easily achieved by including parameters for harvest volume 
from each FMA and the reforestation rate associated with each FMA. While we have only 
included two in our model to reflect the number of FMAs in which the sample IO firm holds an 
allocation, it is possible to add an infinite number of FMA harvest volume and reforestation rate 
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parameters to reflect harvesting activities in any number of FMAs. The Crown dues and 
reforestation fee cost model developed for the factual model is given by:  
Cd = rs1*ps1*Qn + rs2*ps2*Qn + rf1*Qn1 + rf2*Qn2     (4.9) 
where, 
rs1 = S1 crown dues rate (in $/m
3) 
rs2 = S2 crown dues rate (in $/m
3) 
rf1 = Reforestation fee in FMA 1 (in $/m
3) 
rf2 = Reforestation fee in FMA 2 (in $/m
3) 
ps1 = Proportion of S1 Fibre Harvested 
ps2 = Proportion of S2 Fibre Harvested 
Qn1 = Volume of fibre harvested in FMA 1 in given year (in m
3) 
Qn2 = Volume of fibre harvested in FMA 2 in given year (in m
3) 
Qn = Total volume of fibre harvested in given year (in m
3) 
and, 
Qn = Qn1 + Qn2 
4.2.6 Scaling Costs 
 In order to assess the timber for crown dues, it must be scaled using one of the 
government–approved weight or volumetric scaling methods. Typically, contract services are 
used on a fee basis per cubic metre scaled. Thus, scaling costs in the factual model variable and 
can be expressed as: 
Cs = sc*Qn           (4.10) 
where, 
sc = Scaling consultant fee (in $/m
3) 
Qn = Volume of fibre harvested in given year (in m
3) 
4.2.7 Road Building and Reclamation Costs 
 In order to access harvest blocks and remove harvested timber, roads must be built. In 
addition, to remain compliant with environmental regulations these roads must be reclaimed and 
“rolled back” to limit access to regenerating forest areas. IOs generally contract these services, 
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often to the same firm that is providing harvesting and hauling services. As such road building 
and reclamation costs represent a variable cost that can be expressed by: 
Cr = kr*Qn           (4.11) 
where, 
kr = Road building and reclamation contracting rate (in $/m
3) 
Qn = Volume of fibre harvested in given year (in m
3) 
4.2.8 Administration Costs  
 The final fibre procurement cost, the administration cost, is fixed. The costs in this 
category represent a number of transaction costs including negotiation costs and enforcement 
costs. The first pair of parameters represents the costs associated with negotiating the required 
harvesting, hauling, road building and reclamation contracts with forestry contractors. The 
second set of parameters represents the costs associated with conducting harvesting site visits to 
ensure that operations are proceeding according to the operating plan and contract. The next set 
of parameters pertains to the costs associated with managing the contractors; considered an 
enforcement cost. The final set of parameters measures the costs associated with conducting 
administrative activities related to the forestry department such as payroll, accounts payable, data 
entry, and reporting. The administration cost equation is given by: 
Ca = wm*xcn + wl*xq + wm*xm + wa*xa      (4.12) 
where, 
wa = administrative assistant wage rate 
wl = foresters wage rate 
wm = upper management/owner wage rate 
xcn = labour hours spent negotiating with forestry contractors 
xa = labour hours spent engaged in administrative activities related to forestry dept 
xm = labour hours spent managing forestry contractors 
xq = labour hours spent engaging in quality control 
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4.3 The IO NGC  
Given that the costs associated with fibre procurement represent the most significant cost 
in forest product production (Niquidest and O’Kelly, 2008), it would seem logical that the IO 
NGC should focus on reducing fibre procurement costs. The most obvious way that a 
cooperative would be able to achieve cost reductions in this area is through creating an economy 
of scale by collectively procuring IO fibre volumes. Much like a woodlot/private landowner 
cooperative, the IO NGC would manage all of the IOs’ fibre allocations as one unit. This would 
include every aspect of forestry management from forest inventory analysis, to developing 
harvesting and scaling plans, conducting stakeholder consultations, consulting with 
Saskatchewan Environment’s Forestry department during the plan approval process, managing 
harvest operations aimed at harvesting the fibre that the IO mills require, as well as acquiring and 
managing relationships with all required contractors. By having the cooperative collectively 
manage the members’ allocations as one unit, the group will have a large enough volume to 
sustain full-time foresters and seasonal forestry staff who can work with the members to ensure 
that they receive good quality rough wood of the right species and size class when needed. In 
addition, the forester will be able to provide members with increased access to technical skills 
and knowledge that is often lacking.  
Management of the IOs’ much larger collective allocation volume also provides the 
group with increased volume buying power, much like a traditional supply cooperative. This is 
important as it is often the case that the IOs who sub-contract their harvesting often have some 
difficulty securing long term contractors at competitive prices. By offering contractors a much 
larger harvest volume they should be able to secure more competitive rates, and to develop 
stable, long-lasting working relationships. The increased volume buying power would also allow 
the cooperative to negotiate more competitive prices on all other supplies associated with 
forestry management and thus further reduce fibre procurement costs.  
Collectively managing the IOs’ fibre volumes also presents both the IOs and the 
Government of Saskatchewan with an opportunity to reduce transaction costs through a 
reduction in the number of permits that IOs must create and the Ministry of Environment must 
process. Currently, all IOs with timber allocations must prepare harvesting and scaling plans that 
must then be reviewed by one the Ministry’s Foresters who will then meet, often more than once, 
with a representative from the company submitting the plan. In many cases, it is the higher paid 
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company and ministry representatives who end up spending a substantial portion of their time 
reviewing plans for relatively small fibre volumes and this further adds to the inefficient 
negotiation costs that both IOs and government face. In the counterfactual case, where the 
cooperative would manage the IOs’ allocation as one unit, there would only be one harvesting 
and scaling plan created that would encompass all of the members’ volumes and as such the 
Ministry of Environment would only have to meet with one individual, more than likely the 
coop’s forester, during the plan development and approval process. This would have the effect of 
significantly reducing the negotiation costs for both IOs and the Government of Saskatchewan.  
In addition, the IOs will be able to achieve further negotiation cost reductions by developing only 
one harvesting plan.   
There are also some much less obvious benefits, which collective management of the 
IOs’ allocations could provide. The first of these is the reduction of timber cruising costs through 
elimination of “the multiple cruise effect.” The multiple cruise effect is a competitive 
inefficiency that occurs when firms that operate within the same geographical area under a 
competitive forest tenure system, such as that in Saskatchewan, raise industry fibre costs by 
failing to share the results of their timber cruises with one another. The lack of information 
sharing commonly results in multiple companies cruising the same stands and coming to the 
same no-harvest conclusion. Had information been shared, firms would not have wasted 
resources cruising the same stands. The failure to share positive results of cruises can potentially 
increase costs in two ways. Firstly, the failure to inform other firms that the stands that were 
cruised were good stands that the firm decided to include in their permit and set aside for future-
year harvesting operations result in companies expending unnecessary resources to find stands 
unavailable. Second, failure of one firm to inform another of quality material that does not suit 
their needs can increase the other firm’s search costs in the event of several unsuccessful cruises 
before they find suitable timber. In the counterfactual case, where the coop performs all of the 
timber cruising for the IOs, all stands would only be cruised once and IO firms would no longer 
be acting individually or competitively. Appendix C contains a more detailed discussion on the 
existence of competitive inefficiencies associated with the multiple cruise effect. 
Collective management of the IOs’ fibre allocations also provides an opportunity for 
increased fibre utilization. This would be achieved through the formation of a cooperatively 
managed log sort yard. In this scenario, timber harvested by the cooperative would first be 
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delivered to a log sort yard in a location central to the IO NGC members’ mills. Once the tree-
length fibre arrived at the sort yard it would be processed and then sorted by species, length, 
diameter class, and quality. Member mills would order the desired quantities of each type of 
fibre required and the cooperative would then subcontract delivery of the raw logs to their 
destination mills. Given that some members of the potential IO NGC require small-diameter 
White Spruce (Picea glauca), Black Spruce (Picea mariana), and Jack Pine (Pinus banksiana), 
while others require large-diameter material, the cooperative should, in theory, be able to target 
stands that will provide sufficient quantities of the various species and diameter classes required 
to meet the needs of IO mills.  The result of this system would potentially be that all member 
mills would receive their entire allocations in raw products that could be directly converted to 
saleable products. This is much different from the current situation in which most mills end up 
harvesting a significant amount of rough wood that is either too large or too small and end up 
having to sell the unusable rough wood, often at a discounted rate. This can significantly 
decrease utilization rates and thus increase rough wood costs. A log sort yard might instead 
create a situation in which utilization rates are maximized and rough wood costs are further 
reduced.  
Despite the fact that utilization rates for individual mills might be increased, there will 
always be residual fibre. While the cooperative will be able to sell residual fibre into pulp and 
hog fuel markets on a cost recovery basis, it is unlikely that the cooperative would generate 
profit without the development of new markets for waste products. Although this represents a 
short term challenge it also provides the cooperative with a long term goal when we look at how 
the cooperative should evolve. A large number of agriculture cooperatives and a handful of 
forestry cooperatives such as the Koocanusa Value Added Cooperative (KVAC) have found that 
by adopting the NGC model they were able to extract additional values (Kinnis and Smith, 
2003).  
4.3.1 IO NGC Share Structure 
The IO NGC would use the NGC model’s unique three-class share structure to confer 
various rights to its membership. Membership in the NGC would be limited to those IOs who 
hold allocations in the PAFMA or Island Forest FMA. The primary reason for this limitation in 
membership is that the majority of IOs within the province hold allocations that are only valid in 
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the two FMAs. Second, these FMAs are located in close geographical proximity to one another 
and to the majority of the existing IO mills. Including IOs with allocations in FMAs on the far 
eastern and western sides of the province would likely inflate transportation costs and erode any 
reductions in costs generated from membership in the IO NGC. Each IO firm would be granted 
one class A “membership share”. Class A shares would confer voting rights to members by 
entitling each Class A shareholder to one vote within the cooperative; thereby upholding the one 
member one vote principal inherent in the cooperative model.  
The second class of shares, Class B shares, are generally recognized within the literature 
pertaining to NGCs as “delivery shares” and confer shareholder’s with the right to provide a 
specified quantity of goods to an NGC for value added processing or marketing. In this case, the 
IOs will be using the NGC to supply goods and services rather than value added processing and 
marketing, so the term “delivery shares” is not entirely appropriate. In the IO case, Class B 
shares will be called “procurement shares”. Each IO will be issued one Class B “procurement 
share” for every cubic metre of wood allocation they pool into the cooperative allocation. In turn, 
each Class B share would entitle its holder to purchase one cubic metre of raw wood from the 
cooperative at the cooperative fibre procurement cost. Class B shares would also be used to 
generate initial internal investment from cooperative members. This would be accomplished by 
attaching a share value to each class B share. Prior to shares being issued, IOs would be required 
to pay the IO NGC a pre-specified price for each share issued. This cash would be utilized to 
fund start-up costs or to leverage financing for the same purpose. Lastly, Class B shares would 
also function as a dividend-bearing share, should the cooperative issue dividends in future years. 
In this case, the total dividends declared would be divided amongst members based on the total 
proportion of class B shares each member holds. 
The third class of shares, Class C “investment shares”, present the IO NGC with a unique 
opportunity to generate additional funds for capital investments from both internal and external 
sources. The redeemable Class C “investment shares” would be non-voting, interest bearing 
shares, which could be issued to both members and non-members. Each Class C share would 
entitle its holder to a dividend that is based on a pre-determined interest rate multiplied by the 
initial share value.  
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4.3.2 IO NGC Organizational Structure 
 The Class A shareholders will be charged with the responsibility of democratically 
selecting the board of directors and voting on all major changes to the structure or function of the 
cooperative. The board of director’s will, in turn, be responsible for directing the overall goals of 
the corporation, engaging in strategic planning, and hiring the cooperative’s chief executive 
officer (CEO). The CEO will be charged with the responsibility of managing the businesses day 
to day affairs, promoting and representing the IO NGC, hiring and managing all other employees 
within the corporation, engaging in activities related to achieving the goals of the cooperative, 
and reporting to the board of directors.  
Figure 4.1: IO NGC Organizational Structure 
 
The log sort yard employees, including the loader operator and slasher operator, will be 
accountable to the yard foreman, who is, in turn, accountable to the CEO. The administrative 
assistant will conduct the cooperative’s administrative functions, including bookkeeping 
activities, and will be directly accountable to the CEO. Lastly, the forester will be responsible for 
all forest management and planning activities and will answer directly to the CEO. The IO NGC 
organizational structure is depicted in Figure 4.1. 
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4.4 IO NGC Fibre Procurement Process 
The section outlines the various stages of NGC fibre procurement process. Under this 
process all aspects of fibre procurement would be delegated to the NGC. IOs would simply be 
responsible for informing the NGC of their fibre type and quantity requirements at the beginning 
of each operating year. The various stages and sub-processes in the IO NGC fibre procurement 
process are described below. 
4.4.1 Forest Inventory Analysis 
Forest inventory analysis is the most important part of the fibre procurement process as it 
determines the quantity, quality and proximity to the mill of the timber that will be harvested by 
the firm.  The IO NGC will be responsible for all forest inventory analysis activities including: 
timber cruising, ground surveying, aerial surveying, stand data analysis, stand selection and 
mapping are included in this stage.  
4.4.2 Forest Licencing 
 Forest licencing involves the development, negotiation, reporting, and enforcement 
activities associated with acquiring and maintaining forest tenure. Under the IO NGC, tenure 
would be granted under a 10 year volume based TSL within the Prince Albert FMA. As a 
requirement of holding the TSL, the cooperative would be charged with the responsibility of 
developing an annual operating plan. The IO NGC forester would conduct all necessary 
reporting activities including the development of monthly wood flow reports and annual reports. 
In addition to reporting activities, the forester will also carry out enforcement activities such as 
periodic operating block inspections ministry staff and working with contractors to address any 
noted deficiencies. 
4.4.3 Transportation Licencing  
 The transportation licencing process begins with the joint development of a transportation 
partnership agreement with the Ministry of Highways and Infrastructure. The partnership 
agreement identifies the primary hauling routes that the IO NGC will use to transport timber and 
sets out the highway tax that will be applied to each tonne of timber hauled. Reporting and 
administrative activities associated with the agreement will be delegated to the IO NGC forester. 
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The IO NGC will provide the ministry with quarterly highway tax remittances and summary 
reports for all fibre harvested by the IO NGC.  
4.4.4 Timber Harvesting and Road Building 
One of the primary advantages of cooperative fibre procurement among IO mills, via the 
IO NGC, is the marketing of larger timber harvest volumes. More specifically, larger timber 
harvest volumes are more attractive to potential contract logging firms who will be hired to 
harvest timber for the IO NGC. Larger fibre volumes are more attractive to potential logging 
contractors as they provide increased revenue potential and reduced transaction costs associated 
with negotiating, administering, and maintaining contracts. In most cases, individual IO mill 
harvest volumes would be so low that it is unlikely that they would be able to find a logging 
contractor that would be willing to take on their harvesting contract. If they are able to find a 
contractor who is willing to perform low volume cuts, the contractor will generally demand 
higher prices and only commit to performing the work after their larger volume harvest contracts 
have been completed (Vermette, 2009). As such, the cooperative presents a new opportunity for 
IOs to access more economical harvesting services than they are currently able to.  
Under the suggested model, timber harvesting would be contracted to independent 
logging firms that utilize mechanical harvesting systems in their operations. Logging contractors 
would be required to harvest timber in tree-length form and to deliver tree-length fibre to the log 
sort yard. Additionally, logging contractors would be contracted to provide road building and 
maintenance services for all required harvesting block access roads.  
4.4.5 The Log Sort Yard 
The primary mechanism that the IO NGC will use to increase fibre utilization and thus 
decrease the effective cost of fibre procurement is the log sort yard. Log sort yards have been 
widely used throughout North America as a means of increasing fibre utilization and ensuring 
that fibre is allocated to its highest value end use. In fact, most large forest product companies 
have integrated log sort yards into their business model to increase utilization and mill 
productivity. 
In order to operate effectively and to ensure that operation costs are minimized the IO log 
sort yard will need to meet a number of conditions related to location of the log sort yard. More 
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specifically, the location of the log sort yard must satisfy conditions pertaining to proximity to 
timber harvesting areas, proximity to existing IO mills, proximity to transportation infrastructure, 
and proximity to well-developed labour markets. 
Condition 1: Proximity to Harvesting Areas 
Given the large effect that timber hauling costs have on overall fibre procurement costs, it 
is intuitive that those sites which minimize the distance from timber harvesting areas to the log 
sort yard will provide the greatest degree of timber hauling cost minimization. Additionally, 
given that the IO NGC will be sourcing fibre from two FMAs that cover a large geographical 
area it becomes especially important that any potential log sort yard site be located in an area 
central to the two FMAs from which fibre will be sourced. 
Condition 2: Proximity to Existing IO Mills 
Since sorted fibre will need to be redirected from the log sort yard to each of the IO mills, 
the distance from the log sort yard to IO mills must also be considered. In order to minimize 
fibre delivery costs from the log sort yard to the IO mills, the log sort yard should be located in 
an area central to the existing IO facilities. 
Condition 3: Proximity to Transportation Infrastructure 
Given that trucking is primary method of fibre transportation in this region of Canada, the 
most important form of transportation infrastructure for the IO NGC is highways. More 
specifically, class 1 and class 2 highways with the largest weight capacities allow for the largest 
volume of fibre per truck to be hauled and thus reduce transportation costs. Therefore, those sites 
located closest to class 1 and class 2 highways will minimize transportation costs and overall 
fibre procurement costs. 
Condition 4: Proximity to Well Developed Labour Markets 
Operation of a log sort yard requires an ample supply of skilled labour be readily 
available. Moreover, economical operation of the log sort yard will require that labour costs are 
not inflated by high travel costs. As such, those sites that are in close proximity to well-
developed labour markets will provide the greatest supply of skilled labour at the lowest cost and 
further decrease overall fibre procurement costs. 
Log Sort Yard Location 
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Given the four conditions presented above, the most suitable site for an IO log sort is the 
Buckland Industrial Park, located 15 km east of Prince Albert, SK on highway #55 (the proposed 
location is indicated by a green marker on figure 4.2). In addition to being located in an area 
central to timber harvesting areas (denoted by orange markers in figure 4.2) and existing IO mills 
(denoted by yellow markers in figure 4.2), the Buckland Industrial Park is located adjacent to a 
primary class 1 highway and in close proximity to Prince Albert, SK, a city with a well-
developed labour market.  
Figure 4.2: IO Mill Locations in Relation to the IO NGC Log Sort Yard and FMAs 
 
 
Log Sort Yard Process Map  
There are several crucial processes that are carried out at the log sort yard. When tree-
length fibre arrives at the sort yard, it will immediately weight scaled for crown dues and 
reforestation fees. To ensure the accuracy of the weight scale and to remain compliant with 
provincial regulations, incoming loads will be sample scaled at a frequency of 1%. Sample scale 
loads will be moved to the adjacent sample scaling area where a forester will conduct manual 
volumetric scaling. Completed sample scale loads will remain in the sample scaling area for 48 
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hours to allow for potential check scaling by Ministry of Environment staff. The remaining 99% 
of loads will be moved directly to the tree-length storage area where they will be offloaded from 
the truck and placed in the storage area to await further processing. Loaders will be used to carry 
tree-length fibre from the storage area to the slashing area where it will be cut into several 
lengths that are suitable for IOs production processes.  Cut to length fibre will then be moved 
from the slashing area to the sorting area where it will be graded and sorted by size, species, and 
grade. Sorted logs will be moved to the finished goods storage area to await shipment to IO 
mills.  
Under this system IO mills will have the flexibility of ordering and receiving only fibre 
that meets their production specifications. This will allow them to use their entire allocation in 
their production process and will increase their utilization to 100%, assuming that their 
individual production process do not generate large amounts of waste that cannot be sold on a 
cost recovery basis. Once IO mills have placed an order for fibre, the IO NGC will contract a 
fibre hauling firm to deliver the required amount of logs to the respective IO mill. By utilizing 
the same firm as was used to haul tree-length, the IO NGC will be able to garner more volume 
buying power and would ideally be able to negotiate the best possible hauling price.  
Once the IO mill receives their fibre from the sort yard, administrative staff will invoice 
the IO mill for the fibre and the IO mill will remit payment to the cooperative under a set of pre-
established terms. Upon receipt of payment by the IO NGC, the IO mills purchase contract for 
that portion of their volume is complete. This process will continue to repeat for each IO mill 
until they have received and paid for their entire annual fibre allocation. It is important to note 
that the IO NGC will need sufficient financial capital to operate and to provide all of the 
aforementioned services. The cooperative will likely need to employ a combination of 
government financing, bank financing (i.e. an operating line) and shareholder financing (i.e. 
through investment shares) to generate sufficient financial capital.   
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Figure 4.3: IO NGC Log Sort Yard Process Map 
 
 
IO Coop timber  allocation harvested  by 
independent logging contractors  and 
hauled by truck to log sort yard in 
treelength form.
The loaded truck enters the sort yard and 
is weighed in at the weigh scale station 
by the scaler (forester). The weighed in 
truck then proceeds to the treelength 
storage unloading area. 
Log loader unloads treelength timber 
from truck  and places it in treelength 
storage area. In the event that the load 
requires a check scale it is placed into 
one of the check scale bunks to await 
manual scaling by the scaler. (only 1% of 
trucks require check scale). 
Log loader moves treelength from 
storage area to slashing area and places 
it on green chain deck which feeds the 
slasher. 
The Slasher cuts logs into desired lengths 
(based on their diameter and  the end 
product requirements of mills) and  cut 
to length bolts are kicked off into specific 
bunks based on their  grade, species, and 
size.
Slasher sorted, cut to to length bolts are 
picked up by the shortwood loader and 
moved to the finished product storage 
area where they are placed in a specific 
bunk based on their size, grade , and 
species. At this point the loader operator 
also removes any  improperly sorted 
bolts and moves them to the appropriate 
bunk.
The shortwood loader removes sorted, 
cut to length bolts from the finished 
product area and places them on trucks 
destined for IO mills. Any improperly 
sorted fibre which was not caught in the 
other processes can be identified and 
removed at this time.
The loaded  transport truck delivers the 
ordered Fibre to the appropriate IO mill 
where it is offloaded by the mills 
personnel.  IO Cooerative admin staff 
invoice IO mills for the delivered load.
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4.5 The Counterfactual Model 
The counterfactual model represents the cost of fibre procurement under the IO NGC. It 
is based on the business as usual case (equation 4.1), but includes key differences pertaining to 
the calculation methods for harvesting, scaling, and administration costs and the addition of log 
sort yard operational costs and sorted fibre delivery costs. The changes are presented in the 
sections that follow. For greater detail on the cost components not described within the sections 
that follow, readers are referred to section 4.1.  
 4.6 Counter-factual Model Assumptions 
1. The IO NGC has some market power and volume buying power. The cooperative is able 
to access premium pricing equal to that obtainable by large industry. 
2. The IO NGC is profit maximizing. 
3. The IO NGC operates as its own business entity. 
4. Inflation is present at the rate of 2% per annum. 
5. Due to the presence of larger residual volumes, it is now possible to sell accrued residual 
fibre into existing pulp and hog fuel markets. 
4.7 The Counter-Factual IO NGC Fibre Procurement Costs  
The counter-factual model is based on the nine cost components of the original factual 
model, but also incorporates the cost of operating the log sort yard (Cy) and the cost of 
delivering fibre from the log sort yard to IO mills (Cm). That being said, it is important to note 
that not all cost components are calculated in the same way as they previously were in the factual 
model. The reasons for this are varied and will be discussed on a component by component basis 
in the coming sections. The total fibre procurement cost model under the IO NGC is presented 
below. 
TCcf = Ci + Cd + Cl + Ct + Ch + Cs + Cx + Cr + Ca + Cy + Cm     (4.13) 
 
And, 
 
ACcf = TCcf/Qn           (4.14) 
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And,  
 
ACecf = ACcf/U           (4.15) 
 
Where, 
 
Ci = Forest Inventory Cost 
Cl = Forest Licencing Cost 
Ct = Transportation Licencing Cost 
Cx = Highway Tax Cost 
Ch = Harvesting Cost 
Cd = Dues and Fees Cost 
Cs = Scaling Cost 
Cr = Road Cost 
Ca = Admin Cost 
Cy = Log Sort Yard Cost 
Cm = Delivery Cost (Sort Yard to IO Mill) 
Qn = Volume of Fibre Harvested in Given Year (in m
3) 
TCcf = Total Cost of Fibre in Counter-factual Case 
ACcf = Average Cost of Fibre in Counter-factual Case 
ACecf = Average Effective Cost of Fibre in Counter-factual Case 
U = Utilization Rate 
4.7.1 Harvesting Costs 
 In the counterfactual model, harvesting costs reflect the fact that the IO NGC will only be 
accepting their fibre in tree-length form. All harvesting will be contracted to logging contractors 
who will provide delivered tree-length to the log sort yard. This is reflected in the first part of the 
harvesting cost equation shown below. Next, the IO NGC log sort yard will be responsible for 
cutting all the fibre to the lengths desired by IO mills. The costs associated with the slashing 
process are depicted in the second part of equation 4.8 which is given by: 
Ch = ht*Qn + st* Qn            (4.16) 
Where, 
Ht = tree-length harvesting rate paid to contractors (in $/m
3) 
49 
 
st = slashing cost (in $/m
3) 
Qn = Volume of Fibre Harvested in Given Year (in m
3) 
4.7.2 Scaling Costs 
Scaling costs include the cost of measuring and assessing the harvested timber for crown 
dues and reforestation fees. The scaling cost function in the IO NGC model varies from that 
utilized in the factual “business as usual” model in that it calculates scaling costs associated with 
the weigh scale method instead of the manual scaling method. Scaling costs under the IO NGC 
model are given by: 
Cs = ((Qn*fs)/sp)*wl + ks        (4.17) 
Where, 
fs = Sample scaling frequency (in %) 
ks = Annual capital cost of weigh scale equipment (in $) 
sp = Scaler productivity (in m
3/hr) 
wl = Foresters wage rate 
Qn = Volume of fibre harvested in given year (in m
3) 
4.7.3 Co-op Administration Costs  
The co-op administration procurement cost component is made up costs that are largely 
fixed. The costs in this category represent a number of transaction costs including negotiation 
costs and enforcement costs, as well as general and administrative expenses associated with 
operating the cooperative. The first parameter represents the general and administrative expenses 
associated with operating the cooperative. The second pair of parameters represents the costs 
associated with negotiating the required harvesting, hauling, road building and reclamation 
contracts with forestry contractors. While the third set of parameters represents the costs 
associated with conducting harvesting site visits to ensure that operations are proceeding 
according to the operating plan and contract. The next set of parameters pertains to the costs 
associated with managing the contractors, also an enforcement cost. This would involve 
meetings between the IO and contracting firm’s management to discuss progress and any issues 
related to the contract. The final set of parameters contains measures the costs associated with 
conducting administrative activities related to the forestry dept. Such as payroll, accounts 
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payable, data entry, and reporting. As was noted earlier, these costs are largely fixed and as such 
there are no parameters related to harvest volume in our administration cost equation which is 
given by: 
Ca = ko + wm*xcn + wl*xq + wm*xm + wa*xa      (4.18) 
Where, 
ko = annual general and administrative expenses 
wa = administrative assistant wage rate 
wl = foresters wage rate 
wm = chief executive officer wage rate 
xcn = labour hours spent negotiating with forestry contractors 
xa = labour hours spent engaged in administrative activities related to forestry dept. 
xm = labour hours spent managing forestry contractors 
xq = labour hours spent engaging in quality control 
4.7.4 Log Sort Yard Costs 
This cost component, that was not present in the factual model, reflects the costs 
associated with the operation of a log sort yard. It incorporates the costs of all activities 
conducted within the log sort yard except for slashing, which was previously included in 
harvesting costs. The general model for log sort yard costs is given by: 
Cy = kl + ke + m + g + we*xe + wf*xf        (4.19) 
Where, 
kl = annual capital cost of log sort yard (including land and buildings) 
ke = annual loader capital cost 
m = repair and maintenance costs 
g = fuel costs 
we = loader operator wage rate 
wf = yard foreman wage rate 
xe = number of loader operator labour hrs required 
xf = number of yard foreman labour hrs required 
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4.7.5 Delivery Costs (Log Sort Yard to IO Mill) 
 The final cost component in the counter-factual model represents the cost associated with 
delivering fibre from the log sort yard to individual IO mills. The method for calculating delivery 
costs is slightly more complicated and involves multiple calculations. The primary delivery cost 
model is given below in 5.12 and is expressed simply as the number of loads multiplied by the 
cost of hauling per load. Hauling services are generally contracted out to hauling contractors who 
charge an hourly rate. In order to calculate hauling costs (hm), we utilize equation 5.12.1 which 
utilizes the average distance from log sort yard to IO mills, the average travelling speed of the 
hauling vehicle and the hourly hauling rate to determine hauling cost per load. Finally equation 
5.12.2 calculates the number of loads hauled annually by simply dividing the total fibre 
harvested by the average volume hauled per load. Following from this, fibre delivery costs are 
given by: 
Cm = hm*nl           (4.20) 
Where, 
hm = Hauling cost per load ($/load) 
nl = Number of loads hauled annually  
 
And, 
hm = (da/ts)*ph                      (4.21) 
Where, 
da = Average distance from log sort yard to IO mill (in km) 
ts = Average travelling speed of hauling vehicle (in km/hr) 
ph = Price of hauling services (in $/hr) 
 
And, 
nl = Qn/Vh                      (4.22) 
Where, 
Qn = Volume of Fibre Harvested in Given Year (in m
3) 
Vh = Average volume of fibre hauled per load (in m
3/load) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Factual Model Analysis 
Data obtained through the case study was fitted to the factual model developed in Chapter 
Four to derive fibre procurement cost estimates under the business as usual case.  Fibre 
procurement cost estimates for the IOs are measured in $/m3 and are listed in Table 5.1 
according to the business as usual variables identified in Chapter Four. All costs, except for 
crown dues, reforestation fees, and highway taxes are subject to inflation at a rate of 2% per year 
over the five-year period. It has also been assumed that IOs are price takers that hold no market 
power and are, thus, subject to the same prices for inputs. 
Given that all IOs are located south of the PAFMA boundary and outside of the Island 
Forest boundary, the assumption that all IO’s harvest locations are located at an equal distance 
from their primary mill site was introduced. This assumption was supported by the fact that IO 
tenure rights allow them to target fibre throughout the PAFMA regardless of the target stand’s 
longitudinal position in the FMA. The final assumptions utilized in the model are related to fibre 
utilization. First, it was assumed that all IOs face the same fibre utilization rates regardless of the 
final products that they produce and that this utilization rate was equal to that generated in the IO 
case study. Lastly, it was assumed that the absence of sufficient residual volumes does not allow 
for the sale of individual IO residual fibre to existing pulp and hog fuel markets.  
The cost derived from the factual fibre procurement model form the base values against 
which the results of the counter-factual model will be compared. Upon running the model, it was 
immediately apparent that harvesting costs were, by far, the most significant costs in the fibre 
procurement process. Crown dues and reforestation fees were a distant and all other costs 
appeared relatively insignificant. The fibre utilization rate of 72% was surprisingly low and had 
an extremely significant effect on the effective cost of fibre procurement.    
5.2 Counter-factual Model Analysis 
 Values obtained from the case study data collection and interview processes as well as 
data generated during the conceptual model development were fitted to the counter-factual fibre 
procurement cost model to generate fibre procurement costs for IOs under NGC model. Fibre 
procurement costs were modeled over a period of 5 years to allow for gradual integration of IOs 
53 
 
into the cooperative and to reveal the feasibility of the cooperative at various participation rates 
and overall harvest volumes. In the analysis, it was assumed that IOs representing 20% of the 
total IO allocation volume across the PAFMA and Island Forest join the cooperative in the first 
year and that IOs continue to join at a rate that results in an additional 20% of total IO allocation 
volume being harvested by the cooperative every year until 100% of the total IO allocation is 
being harvested by the IO cooperative in year five.  
                
  Table 5.1: Factual Model Average Cost Function Year 1 through Year 5 (all values 
in $ per m harvested) 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.93   
  Forest Licencing 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.74   
  Transport Licencing 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35   
  Harvesting 42.75 43.60 44.47 45.36 46.27   
  Dues & Refor. 5.82 5.94 6.06 6.18 6.30   
  Highway Tax 2.50 2.55 2.60 2.65 2.71   
  Roads & Reclam. 1.85 1.88 1.92 1.96 2.00   
  Scaling 1.50 1.53 1.56 1.59 1.63   
  Admin 2.09 2.13 2.17 2.22 2.26   
  Sort Yard* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
  Gross Cost 58.37 59.54 60.73 61.95 63.19   
  Utilization Rate (%) 72% 72% 72% 72% 72%   
  Effective Cost** 81.07 82.70 84.35 86.04 87.76   
  
Assume all costs rise at rate of inflation except for dues & refor and highway tax, which 
are fixed.   
  
*Sort Yard and Sort Yard to Mill Values are zero because these do not exist in factual 
case. The columns are simply there to aid in comparison   
  
**Effective cost is measured as gross cost divided by utilization rate. This is the real cost 
for each unit of effective timber as you pay for all timber but can only utilize a portion in 
production.   
All costs except for crown dues, reforestation fees, and highway taxes are subject to 
inflation at a rate of 2% per year as depicted in Table 5.2. It was assumed that due to the creation 
of economies of scale, the IO NGC has some market power and is able to access premium 
pricing equal to that obtainable by large industry. It was also assumed that the presence of 
economies of scope make it possible for the IO NGC to sell accrued residual fibre into existing 
pulp and hog fuel markets on a cost recovery basis. This assumption is a departure from the 
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current reality where IOs lack the economies of scale and scope necessary to negotiate contracts 
and sell fibre to the existing pulp and hog fuel markets on a cost recovery basis. The final 
assumption relates to sort yard to mill shipping, a cost that was absent in the factual model. In 
order to avoid a number of implementation challenges including cost tracking, member 
participation rates and cohesion challenges related to distance to sort yard and sort yard to mill 
shipping rates, it is assumed that the IO cooperative will charge all members an equalized per 
cubic metre sort yard to milling shipping rate. This rate is calculated by determining the spatial 
location of IO mills and the average shipping distance to IO mills and then using market data to 
determine a per load cost. That per load cost is then broken down into a per cubic metre sort yard 
to mill shipping cost and extrapolated across the total number of cubic metre harvest by the IO 
cooperative to derive total sort yard to mill shipping costs. The calculations used to derive sort 
yard to mill shipping costs in the counterfactual model can be observed in tables B27, B28, and 
B29 located in Appendix B. 
The fibre procurement costs generated under the counter-factual model exhibit results 
similar to the results generated under the factual model in that harvesting costs represent the 
most significant fibre procurement cost with crown dues and reforestation fees coming in at a 
distant second. The major departure in the results exhibited by the counter-factual is the 
inclusion of cooperative administration costs, sort yard, costs and sort yard to mill shipping costs 
that are similar in significance to crown dues and reforestation fees. Another major departure 
from the fibre procurement costs obtained under the factual model is the much higher utilization 
rate obtained by the IO cooperative and the corresponding effect, or lack thereof, on the effect 
cost of fibre procurement. 
5.3 Comparative Analysis 
 After comparing the fibre procurement costs under both models it is clear that, in 
effective terms, the fibre procurement costs are lower under the counter-factual (IO NGC) model 
than they are under the factual (business as usual) model. Moreover, the results depicted in table 
5.3 below reveal that the gap between fibre procurement costs in the factual model and 
counterfactual model widens as time progresses. In essence, revealing that as more IOs 
participate in the cooperative and the IO NGC’s annual harvest volume increases, the 
cooperative is better able to achieve reductions in the effective cost of fibre procurement.  This 
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does not hold true in the case of gross costs. Instead gross costs in the counter-factual model 
exceed gross costs in the factual model in all years and at all harvest levels. Despite this, the 
increasing returns to scale observed in relation to gross costs and effective costs indicate that 
economies of scope and economies of scale are present.    
                
  Table 5.2: IO Cooperative Average Cost Function Year 1 through Year 5 (all values 
in $ per m harvested) 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory         0.77      0.74       0.74      0.74    0.75    
  Forest Licencing         0.30       0.15    0.10        0.08     0.06    
  Transport Licencing  0.14  0.07   0.05   0.04   0.03    
  Harvesting       38.25        38.56        38.87        39.19        39.52    
  Dues & Refor.         6.04          6.16          6.28          6.41          6.54    
  Highway Tax         2.50         2.55          2.60          2.65          2.71    
  Roads & Reclam.         2.00          2.04          2.08          2.12          2.16    
  Scaling         0.13          0.08          0.06          0.05          0.05    
  Co-op Admin         5.82          2.66          1.68          1.56          1.19    
  Sort Yard         6.02          4.98          4.43          4.33          4.16    
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping         5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40    
  Gross Cost       67.36        63.21        61.96        62.06        61.86    
  Utilization Rate (%)* 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%   
  Effective Cost**       67.36        63.21        61.96        62.06        61.86    
  
* Model operates under the assumption that the cooperative achieves 100% utilization 
through sorting and delivering specific fibre to the appropriate IO mill.   
  
* in the event that assumption does not hold, assume that unutilized fibre is sold to 
external mills on a cost recovery basis   
  
**Effective cost is measured as gross cost divided by utilization rate. This is the real cost 
for each unit of effective timber as you pay for all timber but can only utilize a portion in 
production.   
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 also confirm that the most significant per unit cost reductions are in 
harvesting costs, suggesting that economies of scale in relation to harvesting costs are present. 
The same can be said for utilization rates, which increase from 72% in the factual model to 100% 
in the counter-factual model using the assumption presented in section 5.2. Table 5.5 expresses 
the model variations in terms of percentage contributions to changes in the gross fibre 
procurement and illustrates the extent, origins, and significance of fibre procurement cost 
reductions. The majority of the costs do not have a significant effect on gross fibre procurement 
costs. The most significant cost changes are the increases generated by sort yard operation and 
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the delivery of fibre from sort yard to mill sites. Cooperative administration costs represent a 
significant cost increase in year one but by year five, is greatly diminished. This reveals 
administration costs are affected by economies of scale achieved through increased harvest 
volumes. While harvesting and scaling costs decrease, it is not enough to reduce overall gross 
fibre procurement costs in all periods. 
                
  Table 5.3: Net Change in Average Cost Between Counterfactual (IO Cooperative) Model 
and Factual Model  (all values in $ per m harvested)* 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory -      0.09  -      0.14  -      0.16  -      0.17  -      0.18    
  Forest Licencing -      0.39  -      0.55  -      0.61  -      0.65  -      0.68    
  Transport Licencing -      0.18  -      0.26  -      0.29  -      0.31  -      0.32    
  Harvesting -      4.49  -      5.04  -      5.60  -      6.17  -      6.75    
  Dues & Refor.         0.22          0.22          0.23          0.23          0.23    
  Highway Tax              -                 -                 -                 -                 -      
  Roads & Reclam.         0.15          0.16          0.16          0.16          0.17    
  Scaling -      1.38  -      1.46  -      1.50  -      1.54  -      1.58    
  Admin         3.73          0.53  -      0.49  -      0.66  -      1.07    
  Sort Yard*         6.02          4.98          4.43          4.33          4.16    
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping         5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40    
  Change in Gross Cost         8.99          3.67          1.23          0.11  -      1.32    
  Change in Utilization Rate (%) 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%   
  Change in Effective Cost -    13.71  -    19.48  -    22.39  -    23.98  -    25.89    
  
* Comparison Calculated by Subtracting Factual Model Values from Counterfactual Model 
Values to yield the net change in average cost realized by the counterfactual model    
However, the fact that the effective costs have decreased by 17% in year one and 
continue to decrease until they are 30% lower in year five reveals that the IO NGC is still more 
efficient than the current IO model. The results also suggest that at all participation rates 
modelled, except for the maximum participation rate, the cost reductions resulting from 
increasing economies of scope and scale are exceeded by the cost increases resulting from 
operation of the log sort yard and the additional leg of delivery required between the sort yard 
and IO mills. This result highlights the importance of the utilization rate which, in the end, is the 
largest contributor to fibre procurement cost reductions. If the utilization rate is below the 100% 
utilization rate employed in the counterfactual, does the IO cooperative still generate fibre procurement 
cost reductions? That question will be explored in the next section of this chapter. 
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  Table 5.4: Net Change in Average Cost Between Counterfactual (IO Cooperative) Model and 
Factual Model  (in %)* 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory -10% -16% -18% -19% -19%   
  Forest Licencing -57% -78% -86% -89% -91%   
  Transport Licencing -57% -78% -86% -89% -91%   
  Harvesting -11% -12% -13% -14% -15%   
  Dues & Refor. 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%   
  Highway Tax 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%   
  Roads & Reclam. 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%   
  Scaling -92% -95% -96% -97% -97%   
  Admin 179% 25% -23% -30% -47%   
  Sort Yard* Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined   
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined Undefined   
  Change in Gross Cost 15% 6% 2% 0% -2%   
  Change in Utilization Rate (%) 39% 39% 39% 39% 39%   
  Change in Effective Cost -17% -24% -27% -28% -30%   
  
*Sort Yard and Sort Yard to Mill Values are undefined because values for these variables did not exist 
in factual case. The rows are simply there to maintain consistency with previous tables.   
 
            
  Table 5.5: Net Wood Procurement Cost Reductions for IO Industry* 
        
  Year 
Volume 
Harvested 
(in m3) 
Net Change in Average 
Effective Wood 
Procurement Cost  
Net Change in Total 
Effective Wood 
Procurement Cost   
  1 40439 -$13.71 -$554,601.32   
  2 80878 -$19.48 -$1,575,845.36   
  3 121317 -$22.39 -$2,716,523.97   
  4 161756 -$23.98 -$3,878,817.13   
  5 202195 -$25.89 -$5,235,478.58   
  
*This model assumes that by year 5 all IO allocations in both the PAFMA 
and Island Forest are being harvest by the IO cooperative. 
  
    
  *This model also assumes that IO mills accept delivery on 100% of their 
allocation volume during that year. 
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  5.4 Sensitivity and Break Even Analysis 
 Sensitivity analysis of the factual model results confirm that changes in harvesting costs 
and utilization rates have the greatest effect on the effective cost of fibre procurement. In fact, 
the analysis revealed that a one percent change in the all other cost components, changed the 
effective cost of fibre procurement by less than one tenth of a percent. From the analysis, it can 
be observed that a one percent change in harvesting costs creates a positively correlated change 
of 0.74% in the effective cost of fibre procurement, a highly significant change by any measure. 
The results of sensitivity analysis reveals similar results for the counter-factual model. Again, it 
can be seen that the two only factors which have a significant effect on the effective cost of fibre 
procurement are harvesting costs and utilization rates. In the counter-factual case, harvesting 
costs have a lesser effect on the effective cost of fibre procurement than in the factual mode, with 
a one percent change in harvesting costs generating a positively correlated change of 0.57%.  
Table 5.6: Factual Model Sensitivity Analysis Summary 
 
 
Table 5.7: Counter-Factual Model Sensitivity Analysis Summary 
 
Changing Cells:
0.860 0.869 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.869
0.683 0.683 0.690 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.683 0.690
0.324 0.324 0.324 0.327 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.327
42.745 42.745 42.745 42.745 43.170 42.745 42.745 42.745 42.745 42.745 42.745 42.745
5.824 5.824 5.824 5.824 5.824 5.882 5.824 5.824 5.824 5.824 5.824 5.824
2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.530 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500
1.847 1.847 1.847 1.847 1.847 1.847 1.847 1.870 1.847 1.847 1.847 1.866
1.502 1.502 1.502 1.502 1.502 1.502 1.502 1.502 1.520 1.502 1.502 1.502
2.088 2.088 2.088 2.088 2.088 2.088 2.088 2.088 2.088 2.110 2.088 2.109
0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.727 0.720
Result Cells:
81.074 81.086 81.083 81.079 81.664 81.155 81.116 81.106 81.100 81.104 80.271 81.156
0.0147% 0.0112% 0.0058% 0.7274% 0.0998% 0.0514% 0.0394% 0.0314% 0.0372% -0.9901% 0.1004%
1% 
Increase in 
Dues & 
Refor Fees
1% 
Increase in 
Utilization 
Rate
1% 
Increase in 
Admin Cost
1% 
Increase in 
Scaling 
Cost
1% Increase 
in Road 
Building Cost
1% 
Increase in 
Highway 
Tax
1% Increase 
in Harvesting 
Costs
Current 
Values:
1% Increase 
in Forest 
Inventory 
Cost
1% Increase 
in Forest 
Licencing 
Cost
1% Increase in 
Transportation 
Licencing Costs
% Change in 
Effective Cost
Forest Inv. Cost
Forest Lic. Cost
Trans. Lic. Cost
Harvesting Cost
Dues & Refor.
Highway Tax
Road Cost
Scaling Cost
Admin Cost
Effective Cost
Utilization Rate
1% 
Decrease in 
Volume 
Harvested
Changing Cells:
0.773 0.781 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.773 0.781
0.296 0.296 0.299 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.299
0.140 0.140 0.140 0.142 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.142
38.250 38.250 38.250 38.250 38.633 38.250 38.250 38.250 38.250 38.250 38.250 38.250 38.250 38.250
6.041 6.041 6.041 6.041 6.041 6.101 6.041 6.041 6.041 6.041 6.041 6.041 6.041 6.041
2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.525 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500
2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.020 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.127 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.126
5.817 5.817 5.817 5.817 5.817 5.817 5.817 5.817 5.817 5.875 5.817 5.817 5.817 5.876
Sort Yard Cost 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.015 6.076 6.015 6.015 6.076
Shipping Cost 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.401 5.455 5.401 5.401
100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.000 100.000
Result Cells:
67.360 67.367 67.363 67.361 67.742 67.420 67.385 67.380 67.361 67.418 67.420 67.414 68.040 67.492
0.0104% 0.0045% 0.0015% 0.5671% 0.0891% 0.0371% 0.0297% 0.0015% 0.0861% 0.0891% 0.0802% 1.0095% 0.1965%
1% 
Increase   
in Admin 
Cost
Current 
Values:
1% Increase 
in Forest 
Inventory 
Cost
1% Increase 
in Forest 
Licencing 
Cost
1% Increase in 
Transportation 
Licencing Costs
1% Increase 
in Harvesting 
Costs
Harvesting Cost
1% 
Increase in 
Dues & 
Refor Fees
1% 
Increase in 
Highway 
Tax
1% Increase      
in Road 
Building Cost
1% 
Increase   
in Scaling 
Cost
1% 
Decrease 
in Volume 
Harvested
Utilization Rate
Effective Cost
% Change in 
Effective Cost
1% 
Increase in 
Sort Yard 
Cost
1% 
Increase in 
Shipping 
Cost
Dues & Refor.
Highway Tax
Road Cost
Scaling Cost
Admin Cost
1% 
Decrease in 
Utilization 
Rate
Forest Inv. Cost
Forest Lic. Cost
Trans. Lic. Cost
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Changes in the utilization rates have the largest impact on the effective cost of fibre 
procurement in both the factual and counter-factual models. In the case of the factual model, a 
one percent change in the utilization rate results in a negatively correlated change in the effective 
cost of fibre procurement of 0.99%. The counter-factual model generates a slightly larger change 
in the effective cost of fibre procurement, with a negatively correlated change in the effective 
cost of one percent resulting from a one percent change in the utilization rate.  
  Table 5.8: IO Cooperative Average Cost Function Year 1 through Year 5 with 90% 
Utilization (all values in $ per m harvested) 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory          0.77           0.74           0.74           0.74           0.75    
  Forest Licencing          0.30           0.15           0.10           0.08           0.06    
  Transport Licencing          0.14           0.07           0.05           0.04           0.03    
  Harvesting        38.25         38.56         38.87         39.19         39.52    
  Dues & Refor.          6.04           6.16           6.28           6.41           6.54    
  Highway Tax          2.50           2.55           2.60           2.65           2.71    
  Roads & Reclam.          2.00           2.04           2.08           2.12           2.16    
  Scaling          0.13           0.08           0.06           0.05           0.05    
  Co-op Admin          5.82           2.66           1.68           1.56           1.19    
  Sort Yard          6.02           4.98           4.43           4.33           4.16    
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping          5.40           5.40           5.40           5.40           5.40    
  Gross Cost        67.36         63.21         61.96         62.06         61.86    
  Utilization Rate (%)* 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%   
  Effective Cost**        74.84         70.23         68.84         68.95         68.74    
  
* Model operates under the assumption that the cooperative achieves 90% utilization through 
sorting and delivering specific fibre to the appropriate IO mill.   
  * Assume that fibre cannot be sold to external mills on a cost recovery basis   
  **Effective cost is measured as gross cost divided by utilization rate. This is the real cost for 
each unit of effective timber as you pay for all timber but can only utilize a portion in 
production. 
  
    
The fact that a change in the utilization rate generates a negatively correlated one to one 
change in the effective cost of fibre procurement in both models means that fibre procurement 
costs and the potential cost reductions stemming from formation of an IO NGC are highly 
dependent on the utilization rate obtained. If, for example, the IO NGC is unable to sell residual 
fibre into the existing pulp and hog fuel market, the data obtained in the IO case study shows that 
the IO NGC will only be able to attain a utilization rate of 90%. Modelling counter-factual fibre 
procurement costs under a utilization rate of 90% (as shown in figure 5.9) reveals that the 
reductions to fibre procurement cost created by the IO NGC are significantly reduced. That being 
said, a utilization rate of 90% reveals that the effective of cost of fibre procurement is still lower 
60 
 
than that observed in the factual model, albeit significantly lower than is the case with a 100% 
utilization rate. Finally, a breakeven analysis of the required utilization rate reveals that the 
breakeven utilization rate for the IO NGC is 83% in year one and slowly falls to 70% by year 5. 
  Table 5.9: Net Change in Average Cost Between Counterfactual (IO Cooperative) 
Model with 90% Utilization and Factual Model  (values in $ per m harvested)* 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory -       0.09  -       0.14  -       0.16  -       0.17  -       0.18    
  Forest Licencing -       0.39  -       0.55  -       0.61  -       0.65  -       0.68    
  Transport Licencing -       0.18  -       0.26  -       0.29  -       0.31  -       0.32    
  Harvesting -       4.49  -       5.04  -       5.60  -       6.17  -       6.75    
  Dues & Refor.         0.22          0.22          0.23          0.23          0.23    
  Highway Tax                -                   -                   -                   -                   -      
  Roads & Reclam.         0.15          0.16          0.16          0.16          0.17    
  Scaling -       1.38  -       1.46  -       1.50  -       1.54  -       1.58    
  Admin         3.73          0.53  -       0.49  -       0.66  -       1.07    
  Sort Yard*         6.02          4.98          4.43          4.33          4.16    
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping         5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40    
  Change in Gross Cost         8.99          3.67          1.23          0.11  -       1.32    
  
Change in Utilization Rate 
(%) 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%   
  Change in Effective Cost -       6.23  -     12.46  -     15.51  -     17.08  -     19.02    
  * Comparison Calculated by Subtracting Factual Model Values from Counterfactual 
Model Values to yield the net change in average cost realized by the Counterfactual Model  
  
    
To analyze the stability of the cooperative model, additional sensitivity analysis was 
conducted to examine the effect of variances in the total volume of fibre harvested on the 
effective cost of fibre procurement. This variable was deemed to be of value as it mirrors the 
participation rate of IOs in the NGC and, thus, also reveals how variances in IO participation 
rates change the effective cost of fibre procurement and viability of the NGC.  In both models, 
the effects of changes in the volume of fibre harvested were only marginally significant when 
compared to the effects of changes in utilization and direct harvesting costs. In the case of the 
factual model, a one percent decrease in the volume of fibre harvested would result in a 0.1% 
increase in the effective cost of fibre procurement, while for the counter-factual model a one 
percent decrease in the volume of fibre harvested increases the effective cost of fibre 
procurement by 0.2%.  
While this latter result may appear significant, closer inspection reveals that it would 
require a major decrease in IO participation in the NGC to have a major impact on the effective 
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cost of fibre procurement. For example, a reduction in the volume of fibre harvested by the IO 
NGC in year one from 40,439 cubic metres to 30,329 cubic metres represents a 25% overall 
reduction in the total volume of fibre harvested. Yet, this reduction in the total volume of fibre 
harvested only increases the effective cost of fibre procurement by 4.91%. When the effective 
cost of fibre procurement is increased by 4.91% the counterfactual model still generates 
reductions in the effective cost of fibre procurement of -12.09%. Thus, the cooperative could still 
provide net economic benefits to IOs if the participation rate was 25% lower than anticipated in 
year one.  
  Table 5.10: IO Cooperative Average Cost Function Year 1 through Year 5 with 
Breakeven Utilization Rate (all values in $ per m harvested) 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory          0.77           0.74           0.74           0.74           0.75    
  Forest Licencing          0.30           0.15           0.10           0.08           0.06    
  Transport Licencing          0.14           0.07           0.05           0.04           0.03    
  Harvesting        38.25         38.56         38.87         39.19         39.52    
  Dues & Refor.          6.04           6.16           6.28           6.41           6.54    
  Highway Tax          2.50           2.55           2.60           2.65           2.71    
  Roads & Reclam.          2.00           2.04           2.08           2.12           2.16    
  Scaling          0.13           0.08           0.06           0.05           0.05    
  Co-op Admin          5.82           2.66           1.68           1.56           1.19    
  Sort Yard          6.02           4.98           4.43           4.33           4.16    
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping          5.40           5.40           5.40           5.40           5.40    
  Gross Cost        67.36         63.21         61.96         62.06         61.86    
  Utilization Rate (%)* 83% 76% 73% 72% 70%   
  Effective Cost**  81.08   82.70   84.35   86.04   87.76    
  * Model operates under the assumption that the cooperative achieves breakeven utilization   
  **Effective cost is measured as gross cost divided by utilization rate. This is the real cost for 
each unit of effective timber as you pay for all timber but can only utilize a portion in 
production. 
  
    
 
  Overall, the results of the sensitivity and breakeven analysis reinforce the fact that as 
participation rates increase, utilization becomes slightly less important as scale effects take over. 
Despite this, utilization remains the most significant factor in the determination of the effective 
cost of fibre procurement. These results also suggest that harvesting cost stability is an important 
factor for IOs in the business as usual case and the IO NGC case. However, the IO NGC does 
provide producers with some reduction in the risks posed by harvesting costs fluctuations, as 
evidenced by the lower harvesting cost sensitivity value in the counter-factual model. The 
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sensitivity analysis also suggests that, ceteris paribus, the IO NGC remains feasible and provides 
net economic benefits to IOs even at relatively low participation rates. 
                
  Table 5.11: Net Change in Average Cost Between Counterfactual (IO Cooperative) 
Model with Breakeven Utilization Rate and Factual Model  (values in $ per m 
harvested)* 
  
    
   Year   
    1 2 3 4 5   
  Forest Inventory -       0.09  -       0.14  -       0.16  -       0.17  -       0.18    
  Forest Licencing -       0.39  -       0.55  -       0.61  -       0.65  -       0.68    
  Transport Licencing -       0.18  -       0.26  -       0.29  -       0.31  -       0.32    
  Harvesting -       4.49  -       5.04  -       5.60  -       6.17  -       6.75    
  Dues & Refor.         0.22          0.22          0.23          0.23          0.23    
  Highway Tax                -                   -                   -                   -                   -      
  Roads & Reclam.         0.15          0.16          0.16          0.16          0.17    
  Scaling -       1.38  -       1.46  -       1.50  -       1.54  -       1.58    
  Admin         3.73          0.53  -       0.49  -       0.66  -       1.07    
  Sort Yard*         6.02          4.98          4.43          4.33          4.16    
  Sort Yard to Mill Shipping         5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40          5.40    
  Change in Gross Cost         8.99          3.67          1.23          0.11  -       1.32    
  
Change in Utilization Rate 
(%) 11% 4% 1% 0% -2%   
  Change in Effective Cost         0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00    
  * Comparison Calculated by Subtracting Factual Model Values from Counterfactual 
Model values to yield the net change in average cost realized by the Counterfactual Model  
  
    
5.5 Implications 
 Counter to our initial hypothesis, the cooperative model’s most significant economic 
benefits for IOs are not driven primarily by the creation of economies of scope in harvesting, nor 
are they driven by significant increases in purchasing power created through the marketing of 
larger harvest volumes. Instead, the most significant economic benefits are derived from large 
increases in fibre utilization and corresponding decreases in the effective cost of fibre 
procurement generated by economies of scope. This suggests that the high fibre specificity of 
IOs is a major source of inefficiency and that, in the absence of the IO NGC, may represent their 
greatest challenge. More specifically, the fibre specificity required to produce product lines 
generates a significant level of unutilized fibre from which IOs are unable to recover value. This 
in turn is having significant negative effects on the profitability and competitiveness of IOs. 
Moreover, small timber volumes make it impossible for them to rectify using conventional 
means such as the addition of product lines which employ underutilized fibre in their production 
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or the resale of underutilized fibre to larger pulp and hog fuel markets. As such, IOs must work 
cooperatively to utilize the full timber profile. It is only by working together that IOs will be able 
to achieve economic benefits generated through full utilization. The incorporation of the log sort 
yard into the cooperative model, while costly, generates significant utilization and efficiency 
gains.  From a policy perspective, the results imply that the pursuit of policies that reduce fibre 
procurement costs should be focused on policies that reduce direct harvesting costs, as this cost 
component is the greatest contributor to overall fibre procurement costs. Secondly, the results 
reveal that, when dealing with IOs, government should focus on policies that facilitate and 
promote cooperation among IOs; especially when that cooperation involves collective 
management and increased utilization of forest resources by IOs. This type of cooperation not 
only provides economic benefits for IOs but also to society in the form of reduced transaction 
costs for government and increased environmental benefits stemming from more efficient use of 
forest resources.  
This research reveals that forest product mills that utilize residual fibre such as pulp 
mills, cogeneration plants, and value added product mills are important in maintaining a healthy 
and vibrant forest economy. These entities assist in ensuring that producers with high fibre 
specificity and high quality fibre needs are able to sell their residual product and achieve cost 
recovery on fibre that cannot be utilized in production processes. As such, policies that 
encourage the establishment and success of forest product mills that utilize residual fibre should 
be encouraged and enhanced.  
In a broader context, this research also reveals that the cooperative model has the 
potential to provide small-scale forest producers with limited access to fibre and highly specific 
fibre needs with benefits beyond the creation of economies of scope, economies of scale, and 
reductions in transaction costs; such as increases in utilization. The increased utilization potential 
afforded to these types of producers under the cooperative model is a major source of economic 
efficiency gains that are not attainable in the absence of cooperation. Increasing utilization will 
undoubtedly become more important as rapidly expanding global demand puts more pressure on 
scarce natural resources. 
The results of this research suggest that the cooperative model is effective in providing 
substantial economic benefits to individual IO firms. The level of benefits is marginally affected 
by the participation rate but mostly dependant upon the utilization rate and the harvesting costs 
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or, in this case, the harvesting rates charged by contractors. The cooperative acts to enhance 
utilization rates by creating a situation in which timber allocations are pooled, collectively 
harvested, and then pre-sorted through the log sort yard. It is through sorting at the log sort yard 
and ensuring that mills receive only timber that meets their production specifications that 
utilization gains are achieved. As such, the log sort yard, while costly, is an essential component 
of an IO NGC.  
The economic analysis in the study has shown that for full utilization, the gains coupled 
with reductions in harvesting costs reduce the effective cost of fibre by 12% to 30%, depending 
on the participation rate. When the utilization rate is reduced to 90%, the effective cost of fibre 
procurement is still reduced by between 8% and 22%, depending on the participation rate. Given 
that fibre represents the largest cost component of most forest products produced by IOs, 
substantial fibre cost reductions generated through cooperating could significantly increase 
profitability and ensure that those firms remain viable and competitive. As long as the IOs have 
the capacity and willingness to organize the NGC and perceive that the fibre cost reductions are 
worth the time investment and reduction in short-term control of harvesting operations, the NGC 
model has the potential to significantly improve the economic status of IO firms operating in the 
forest sector. 
5.6 Limitations 
As is the case with any academic work, there are certain limitations on the durability of 
this research. While this study has demonstrated that the NGC model has the potential to 
generate substantial increases in fibre utilization, thus reducing fibre procurement costs for forest 
producers, the nature of the benefits provided by the model limit its applicability. The NGC 
model will be most successful when utilized in situations where producers either have highly 
specific fibre needs or are operating in areas with low grade fibre. That is to say, the NGC model 
will provide limited benefits to producers whose utilization is already high. The results of this 
research also suggest that the NGC model may also prove to be a potentially useful tool anytime 
increased utilization of forest resources is the policy goal. With increasingly scarce resources and 
a growing population this will likely become a global forest policy objective in the near future. 
The cost analysis presented in this study has clearly illustrates that policies aimed at 
reducing taxes, surcharges, and royalties (e.x. fuel taxes, highway taxes, timber royalties, etc.) 
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will have little impact on the cost effectiveness of small to medium sized producers. This is 
because these costs comprise such a small portion of IOs total fibre procurement costs and 
because IOs lack the economies of scope required to generate a significant level of cost savings 
on such small ticket items. The extension here is that policies aimed at improving economic 
outcomes for small to medium sized producers should focus on enhancing utilization potential 
and increasing economies of scope rather than providing subsidies and tax reductions. 
 Lastly, the NGC model can only be utilized by producers if the tenure and regulatory 
systems in the region allow for collective management of IO tenure allocation volumes at every 
point along the supply chain. Currently, many tenure regimes lack the flexibility required to 
immediately implement cooperative fibre procurement such as that suggested through the NGC 
model within this study. As such, the ability of producers to reorganize using the NGC model 
will, in many cases, be a function of the political will to restructure tenure and regulatory 
systems to allow for true collective management of natural resources.  
5.7 Future Work 
The concept of transaction costs in the forest sector have been rather understudied. This 
is especially true of the transaction costs incurred by the public sector. While it is true that some 
studies have eluded to the concept and one study has even suggested that as much as 75% of 
Saskatchewan’s Forest Service Branch’s operational staff is dedicated to working with IOs 
(Government of Saskatchewan, 2006), no study has attempted to derive an empirical estimate of 
transaction costs incurred by governmental bodies under various tenure structures with varying 
forms of producer organization.  Such research could provide insight into the economic costs of 
the various forest tenure systems and forms of producer organization (e.x. the NGC model) and 
be utilized to guide developing nations who are only now constructing forest tenure systems in a 
landscape that often includes many small scale producers.  
Forest cooperatives, particularly NGC’s, may also have the potential to improve 
environmental outcomes by increasing overall fibre utilization. In a time when most countries are 
faced with a shrinking forest resource and increasing global demand for forest products, 
maximizing utilization of harvested fibre is becoming increasingly important. Further research 
should be conducted to examine the NGC model’s effectiveness as a method of enhancing 
sustainable use of forest resources. 
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Appendix A: Factual Model Background Data and Calculation Tables  
 
 
 
 
              
  Table A1: IO Producer PAFMA Harvest History (in m3)   
         
    PAFMA   
  Year S1 S2 Undersize Combined   
  2007         17,449           14,258               323            32,030    
  2008               -                    -                   -                    -      
  2009          3,054             4,582               799             8,435    
  
07-09 
Avg          6,835             6,280               374            13,488    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.    
              
 
 
 
 
              
  Table A2: IO Producer Island Forest Harvest History (in m3)   
         
    Island Forest   
  Year S1 S2 Undersize Combined   
  2007          6,936             1,733                 -               8,670    
  2008          2,768               692                 -               3,460    
  2009               -                    -                   -                    -      
  
07-09 
Avg          3,235               808                 -               4,043    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.    
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
              
  Table A3: IO Producer Harvest History - All FMAs (in m3)   
         
    Total - All FMAs   
  Year S1 S2 Undersize Combined   
  2007         24,385           15,991               323            40,700    
  2008          2,768               692                 -               3,460    
  2009          3,054             4,582               799             8,435    
  
07-09 
Avg         10,069             7,088               374            17,532    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.    
              
 
 
 
 
                  
  Table A4: IO Timber cruising Costs 2007-2009 (in $)     
           
  Year 
Aerial 
Survey  Labour 
Forestry 
Supplies Travel  Total Cost 
* Total Cost 
per m3   
  2007             -     35,455.00      3,821.16    5,000.00     44,276.16              1.11    
  2008  1,072.19   23,463.96         562.38    5,000.00     30,098.53              0.75    
  2009  1,072.19   22,755.00                 -      5,000.00     28,827.19              0.72    
  
07-09 
Avg 714.79  27,224.65    1,461.18  5,000.00   34,400.63             0.86    
  * 40,000 m3 surveyed per year during 2007, 2008, and 2009.     
   Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.        
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  Table A5: Average IO Forest Licencing Cost Calculation   
       
  Activity 
Labour 
Hrs 
Labour Cost 
($)   
  Annual Operating Plan Development   
  GIS Development 20         567.32    
  Document Development 80      2,269.28    
  Total AOP Development Cost      2,836.61    
      
  Negotiation Costs*   
  Discussions with SERM 8         317.70    
  Revisions 4         158.85    
  Signing 4         158.85    
  Total AOP Negotiation Cost         635.40    
      
  Reporting Costs   
  Cutover Summary 40      1,134.64    
  GIS Development 20         567.32    
  Wood Flow Summary 80      2,269.28    
  Total AOP Reporting Cost      3,971.25    
      
  Enforcement Costs   
  Self-Audit 80      2,269.28    
  Government Inspection 40      1,134.64    
  Government Interaction 40      1,134.64    
  Total AOP Enforcement Cost      4,538.57    
      
  Total Forest Licencing Cost 416    11,981.82    
      
  Average Cost of Forest Licencing**             0.68    
  * Labour Costs associated with negotiation costs are costed at the 
management wage rate, all other labour costs are costed at the 
forester wage rate. 
  
    
    
  **Average Cost of Forest Licencing calculated using an average 
2007-2009 harvest volume of 17531.54 
  
    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.     
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  Table A6: Harvesting Cost Matrix 2007-2009 (in $)     
           
    Tree-length Converted to Shortwood   Shortwood   
  Year 
Delivered 
Treelength 
Bucking 
Cost 
Loader and 
Equipment 
Cost 
Manufactured 
Shortwood Price   
Delivered 
Shortwood   
  2007 32.92 8.27 1.20 42.39   30.49   
  2008 36.21 8.27 1.20 45.69   36.36   
  2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   44.82   
  
 Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.  
    
 
 
 
 
                
  Table A7: Harvesting Composition Matrix     
          
  Year 
Total 
Harvest 
Vol. (in m3) 
% Harvest-
Treelength 
% Harvest-
Cut to Length 
Treelength 
Harvest Vol. 
(in m3) 
Cut to Length 
Vol. (in m3)    
  2007 40,699.85 82% 18% 33239.56 7460.28   
  2008 3,459.76 20% 80% 691.95 2767.81   
  2009 8,435.00 0% 100% 0.00 8435.00   
  07-09 Avg 17,531.54 34% 66% 11310.51 6221.03   
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.      
                
 
 
 
 
              
  Table A8: IO Blended Harvesting Costs (in $)   
         
  Year 
Converted 
Shortwood 
Costs 
Delivered 
Shortwood 
Costs 
Total Harvesting 
Cost 
Blended 
Harvesting Cost 
per m3   
  2007    1,409,137.65       227,463.99  1,636,601.64               40.21    
  2008        31,612.09       100,637.50     132,249.59                38.23    
  2009                   -         378,056.70     378,056.70                44.82    
  07-09 Avg      480,249.91       235,386.06     715,635.98                41.09    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.     
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  Table A9: IO Crown Dues and Reforestation Costs 2007-2009 (in $)   
            
   PAFMA Island Forest All FMAs   
  Year 
S1 Dues 
& Refor. 
S2 Dues & 
Refor. 
Combine
d Cost 
S1 Dues 
& Refor. 
S2 Dues 
& Refor. 
Combine
d Cost 
Total 
Cost 
Cost/ 
m3   
  2007 113,419 74,854 188,274 23,289 4,810 28,099 216,373 5.32   
  2008               -                -                   -    19,929 4,116 24,045 24,045 6.95   
  2009 19,853 24,055 43,908       -            -                  -    43,908 5.21   
  
07-09 
Avg 44,424 32,969 77,394 14,406 2,975 17,381 94,775 5.82   
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.     
                      
 
 
 
 
                  
  Table A10: SK Crown Dues and Reforestation Rates (in $)    
           
  Crown Dues   Reforestation Rates   
  Year Quarter S1 Rate S2 Rate   PAFMA 
Island 
Forest   
  2007 Q1     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q2     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q3     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q4     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  2008 
 
 
 
Q1     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q2     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q3     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q4     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  2009 
  
  
  
Q1     2.00       0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q2     2.00      0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q3     2.00      0.75    4.50 5.200   
  Q4     2.00      0.75    4.50 5.200   
  
3 Year 
Average       2.00       0.75    4.50 5.20   
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.      
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Table A11: IO Incremental Asphalt Fee 
Highway Tax   
      
  Year 
Incremental Asphalt 
Fees ($/m3)   
  2007  $                        1.50    
  2008  $                        2.00    
  2009  $                        4.00    
  07-09 Average  $                        2.50    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.   
        
 
 
 
 
            
  Table A12: IO Scaling Costs 2007-2009 (in $)   
        
  Year 
Total Scaling 
Costs   
Scaling Cost 
per m3 
Harvested   
  2007 45356.06   1.11   
  2008 8533.52   2.47   
  2009 7794.32   0.92   
  07-09 Avg 20561.3   1.50   
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.   
            
 
 
 
 
          
  Table A13: IO Road Building and Reclamation Costs   
       
  Year 
Total Road 
Building/ 
Reclamation Costs 
Road Building/ 
Reclamation 
Cost/m3   
  2007  $           28,911.48   $                  0.71    
  2008  $           10,373.00   $                  3.00    
  2009  $           15,457.00   $                  1.83    
  07-09 Avg  $           18,247.16   $                  1.85    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.    
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  Table A14: IO Fibre Utilization Rates      
           
  Year 
Wrong 
Species Undersize Oversize 
Poor 
Quality 
Total Unutilized 
Fibre 
Utilization 
Rate   
  2007 3% 1% 20% 15% 39% 61%   
  2008 2% 0% 15% 10% 27% 73%   
  2009 1% 2% 10% 5% 18% 82%   
  
07-09 
AVG 2% 1% 15% 10% 28% 72%   
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.   
     
 
 
 
 
                  
  Table A15: IO Labour Wage Rates 2007-2009     
           
  Senior Manager Wages  Forester Wages     
  Wage 35.000 /Hr  Wage 25.000 /Hr   
  CPP 0.866 /Hr  CPP 0.619 /Hr   
  EI 0.490 /Hr  EI 0.350 /Hr   
  Vacation 2.019 /Hr  Vacation 1.442 /Hr   
  WCB 1.337 /Hr  WCB 0.955 /Hr   
    39.712 /Hr    28.366 /Hr   
           
  Admin Assistant Wages       
  Wage 25.000 /Hr       
  CPP 0.619 /Hr       
  EI 0.350 /Hr       
  Vacation 1.442 /Hr       
  WCB 0.955 /Hr       
    28.366 /Hr       
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.      
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Appendix B: Counterfactual Model Background Data and Calculation Tables 
 
 
 
 
                        
  Table B1: IO NGC Softwood Allocation Volume (in m3)       
              
  
Year 
PAFMA Island Forest Total - All FMAs   
  S1 S2 Total S1 S2 Total S1 S2 Total   
  1  73,215   76,785   150,000   25,476        26,719   52,195   98,691   103,504   202,195    
  2  73,215   76,785   150,000   25,476        26,719   52,195   98,691   103,504   202,195    
  3  73,215   76,785   150,000   25,476        26,719   52,195   98,691   103,504   202,195    
  4  73,215   76,785   150,000   25,476        26,719   52,195   98,691   103,504   202,195    
  5  73,215   76,785   150,000   25,476        26,719   52,195   98,691   103,504   202,195    
  Source Data: Saskatchewan Ministry of Environment, 2010.      
                        
 
 
 
 
                        
  Table B2: IO NGC Softwood Harvest Volume (in m3)      
              
  
Year 
PAFMA Island Forest Total - All FMAs   
  S1 S2 Total S1 S2 Total S1 S2 Total   
  1  14,643   15,357     30,000     5,095          5,344   10,439   19,738     20,701     40,439    
  2  29,286   30,714     60,000   10,191        10,687   20,878   39,477     41,401     80,878    
  3  43,929   46,071     90,000   15,286        16,031   31,317   59,215     62,102   121,317    
  4  58,572   61,428   120,000   20,381        21,375   41,756   78,953     82,803   161,756    
  5  73,215   76,785   150,000   25,476        26,719   52,195   98,691   103,504   202,195    
                        
 
 
 
 
  Table B3: IO NGC Harvest Summary Table   
          
  Year 
Total Harvest 
Vol. (m3) 
Average Block 
Vol. (m3) 
No. Blocks 
Harvested   
  1                40,439          20,220                  2    
  2                80,878   20,220                  4    
  3              121,317          20,220                  6    
  4              161,756         20,220                  8    
  5              202,195          20,220                10    
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  Table B4: IO NGC Forest Inventory Costs   
            
  Year 
Aerial 
Survey 
Ground 
Recon. Sampling 
Forestry 
Supplies* 
Travel 
Cost Total Cost 
Cost Per m3 
Harvested   
  1    3,913.01   10,749.92    12,541.57      1,010.98     3,044.09     31,259.57                 0.77    
  2    3,991.27   21,929.83    25,584.81      2,021.95     6,209.95     59,737.81                 0.74    
  3    4,071.09   33,552.65    39,144.75      3,032.93     9,501.23     89,302.65                 0.74    
  4    4,152.52   45,631.60    53,236.87      4,043.90    12,921.67    119,986.55                 0.74    
  5    4,235.57   58,180.29    67,877.00      5,054.88    16,475.13    151,822.86                 0.75    
  *Allow $0.25 per m3 sampled for forestry supplies    
  Source Data: IO Historical Operations Data, 2010.    
                    
 
 
 
 
            
  Table B5: IO NGC Forest Inventory Travel Costs   
        
  Average Trip Distance  320  km (return)    
  Mileage Rate  $     0.38   /km    
  Average Trip Cost  $  121.60  /Trip   
  Source Data: IO Historical Operations Data, 2010.   
            
 
 
 
 
            
  Table B6: IO NGC Forest Inventory Sampling Costs   
        
  Activity 
Labour 
Hrs/Trip Cost/trip   
  Sample Planning Labour              5   $             232.60    
  Sampling Labour            10   $             465.20    
  Post Sampling Labour              5   $             232.60    
  Total             20   $             930.41    
  Source Data: IO Historical Operations Data, 2010.   
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  Table B7: IO NGC Ground Reconnaissance Survey Costs   
        
  Activity 
Labour 
Hrs/Trip Cost/trip   
  Survey Planning Labour              5   $             232.60    
  Survey Labour            10   $             465.20    
  Post Survey Labour              5   $             232.60    
  Total             20   $             930.41    
  
Source Data: IO Historical Operations Data, 2010. 
  
 
 
 
 
            
  Table B8: IO NGC Aerial Survey Costs   
        
  Activity 
Labour 
Hrs/Trip Cost   
  Aircraft Rental             -     $         5,500.00    
  Survey Planning Labour            20   $            930.41    
  Survey Labour            10   $            465.20    
  Post Survey Labour            20   $            930.41    
  Total             50   $         7,826.02    
  * One Aerial Survey Every Two Years    
  Source Data: IO Historical Operations Data, 2010.   
            
 
 
 
 
            
  Table B9: IO NGC Forest Inventory Productivity Data   
        
  Cruise Productivity 700.00 m3 per hour   
  Sampling Ratio 5%     
  Sample Plot Size 0.04 hectare   
  Sampling Productivity 5.00 hrs/sample   
  Avg Stand Productivity 150.00 m3 per hectare   
  Source Data: IO Historical Operations Data, 2010.   
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  Table B10:Counterfactual Model  Forest Inventory Background Information   
           
  Year 
M3 
Surveyed* 
M3 
Sampled** 
No.  Of 
Sample 
Plots 
No. of 
Timbercruise 
Trips 
No. 
Sampling 
Trips 
Total 
No. 
Trips   
  1 80,878 4,044 27 12 13 25   
  2 161,756 8,088 54 23 27 50   
  3 242,634 12,132 81 35 40 75   
  4 323,512 16,176 108 46 54 100   
  5 404,390 20,220 135 58 67 125   
  * Survey 200% Annual harvest to allow for 50% rejection rate.   
  ** Sampling Ratio of 5% employed.   
 
 
 
                    
  Table B11: IO NGC Forest Licencing Costs*   
            
  
Yea
r 
AOP 
Developme
nt 
AOP 
Negotiatio
n Cost 
AOP 
Reporting 
Cost 
AOP 
Enforceme
nt Cost 
Total Forest 
Licencing 
Cost 
 
Harves
t Vol. 
Cost 
per 
m3   
  1  $    2,836.61   $    635.40   $    3,971.25   $   4,538.57   $     11,981.82  40439  $ 0.30    
  2  $    2,893.34   $    648.11   $    4,050.67   $   4,629.34   $     12,221.46  80878  $ 0.15    
  3  $    2,951.20   $    661.07   $    4,131.69   $   4,721.93   $     12,465.89  121317  $ 0.10    
  4  $    3,010.23   $    674.29   $    4,214.32   $   4,816.37   $     12,715.21  161756  $ 0.08    
  5  $    3,070.43   $    687.78   $    4,298.61   $   4,912.69   $     12,969.51  202195  $ 0.06    
  *Forest licencing costs are equal to those incurred under the factual individual producer model. The only 
variable which changes is the harvest volume applied for under the licence. 
  
    
                    
 
 
 
                  
  Table B12: IO NGC Transportation Licencing Costs   
           
  Year 
Partnership 
Agreement 
Developmen
t 
Partnership 
Agreement 
Negotiation 
Cost 
PA 
Reporting 
Cost 
Total 
Transportation 
Licencing 
Costs 
 
Harvest 
Vol. 
Cost 
per 
m3   
  1  $       658.09   $      476.55   $ ,538.57   $         5,673.21    40,439   $ 0.14    
  2  $       671.25   $      486.08   $4,629.34   $         5,786.68    80,878   $ 0.07    
  3  $       684.68   $      495.80   $ ,721.93   $         5,902.41  121,317   $ 0.05    
  4  $       698.37   $      505.72   $ ,816.37   $         6,020.46  161,756   $ 0.04    
  5  $       712.34   $      515.83   $4,912.69   $         6,140.87  202,195   $ 0.03    
  *Transportation licencing costs are equal to those incurred under the factual individual 
producer model. The only variable that changes is the harvest volume applied for under the 
licence. 
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  Table B13: Current Timber Harvesting 
Market Prices  
  
    
       
  Activity $/tonne $/m3   
  Timber Harvesting  $   19.38   $   22.85    
  Log Loading  $     1.73   $     2.04    
  Hauling  $   11.32   $   13.35    
  Total Cost $    32.44   $   38.25    
  
* Rates Based on a hauling rate of $135/hr, a 
round trip of 320km per hour, an average speed 
of 90km per hour, an 1 hr/trip allowance for 
loading and unloading, and a 47m3 payload. 
  
    
    
    
    
  Source Data: Eagle Creek Contracting, 2010. 
Norrish Logging, 2010. 
  
    
 
 
 
                
  Table B14: IO NGC Delivered Treelength Costs 2011-2015   
          
  Year 
Treelength 
Harvesting 
Log 
Loading 
Treelength 
Hauling Total Cost 
Average 
Cost per m3   
  1  $924,183.75   $82,690.13   $539,933.44  $1,546,807.32   $         38.25    
  2 $1,848,367.50  $168,687.86  $1,101,464.22  $3,118,519.57   $         38.56    
  3 $2,772,551.25  $258,092.42  $1,685,240.25  $4,715,883.92   $         38.87    
  4 $3,696,735.00  $351,005.69  $2,291,926.74  $6,339,667.43   $         39.19    
  5 $4,620,918.75  $447,532.25  $2,922,206.60  $7,990,657.60   $         39.52    
                
 
 
                        
  Table B15: IO NGC Softwood Dues and Reforestation Costs: Year 1 through Year 5     
              
  
Year 
PAFMA Island Forest Total - All FMAs   
  
S1 Dues 
& Refor. 
S2 Dues 
& Refor. 
Combined 
Cost 
S1 Dues 
& Refor. 
S2 Dues 
& Refor. 
Combined 
Cost Total Cost   
Cost 
per m3   
  1     95,180      80,624      175,804      36,686      31,795        68,481     244,285         6.04    
  2   190,359    161,249      351,608      73,372      63,590      136,962     488,570         6.04    
  3   285,539    241,873      527,411    110,058      95,385      205,443     732,855         6.04    
  4   380,718    322,497      703,215    146,744    127,181      273,925     977,140         6.04    
  5   475,898    403,121      879,019    183,430    158,976      342,406  1,221,424         6.04    
  *Operates under the assumption that crown dues and reforestation fees remain at the 07-09 3 year average 
for the next 5 years. 
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  Table B16: IO NGC Scaling Background Data   
        
  Weigh Scale Capital Cost     
  Equipment Cost  $ 15,000.00      
  Installation Cost  $ 15,000.00      
  Total Cost  $ 30,000.00      
  Amortization period 10 Years     
  Interest Rate 4.45%     
  Annual Equip. Cost  $   3,722.28      
  Annual R&M Cost  $      372.23      
  Total Annual Cost  $   4,094.51      
  Source Data: Massload, 2010. 
CRA, 2010. Bank of Canada, 2011. 
    
      
          
  Forester Wage Cost    
  Wage 25.00 /Hr    
  CPP 0.62 /Hr    
  EI 0.35 /Hr    
  Vacation 1.44 /Hr    
  WCB 0.96 /Hr    
    28.366 /Hr    
  
Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010. CRA, 
2010.    
        
  Sample Scale Frequency 1.00%     
  Sample Scale Scaler Productivity 11.75 m3/hr   
  Source Data: MOE Forest Service Branch, 2010.                 
IO Historical Forestry Data, 2010. 
  
    
 
 
 
 
  
                  
  Table B17: IO NGC Sample Scaling Labour Cost Calculation   
           
  Year 
Total Harvest 
(m3) 
Sample Scale 
Volume (m3) 
Scaler 
Labour 
Hrs 
Scaler 
Labour 
Cost   
  1 40,439.00 404.39  34.42  $    976.25    
  2 80,878.00 808.78  68.83  $ 1,991.55    
  3 121,317.00 1,213.17  103.25  $ 3,047.07    
  4 161,756.00 1,617.56  137.66  $ 4,144.02    
  5 202,195.00 2,021.95  172.08  $ 5,283.63   
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  Table B18: IO NGC Scaling Cost   
            
  Year 
Total Harvest 
(m3) 
Scaler Labour 
Cost 
Weigh 
Scale Cost 
Total 
Scaling Cost 
 Scaling Cost 
per m3   
  1 40,439.00  $            976.25   $  4,094.51   $     5,070.76   $             0.13    
  2 80,878.00  $         1,991.55   $  4,094.51   $     6,086.06   $             0.08    
  3 121,317.00  $         3,047.07   $  4,094.51   $     7,141.58   $             0.06    
  4 161,756.00  $         4,144.02   $  4,094.51   $     8,238.53   $             0.05    
  5 202,195.00  $         5,283.63   $  4,094.51   $     9,378.14   $             0.05    
                    
 
 
 
              
  
Table B19: IO NGC Road Building and 
Reclamation Costs   
         
  Year 
Total Harvest 
(m3) 
Road Building & 
Reclamation Cost 
($/m3)   
  1 40,439.00  $                      2.00    
  2 80,878.00  $                      2.04    
  3 121,317.00  $                      2.08    
  4 161,756.00  $                      2.12    
  5 202,195.00  $                      2.16    
  *Assume Rate is set at $2.00 per m3 in Year 1 
and rises at the rate of inflation (2%) 
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  Table B20: Forecasted Administrative Expenses: Year 1 through Year 5    
           
   Item Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5   
  Accounting and Legal 
       
20,000.00  
       
10,000.00  
       
10,200.00  
        
10,404.00  
       
10,612.08    
  Insurance 
       
35,000.00  
       
35,700.00  
       
36,414.00  
        
37,142.28  
       
37,885.13    
  Telephone/Internet 
         
6,000.00  
         
6,120.00  
         
6,242.40  
          
6,367.25  
         
6,494.59    
  Office Supplies 
         
6,000.00  
         
6,120.00  
         
6,242.40  
          
6,367.25  
         
6,494.59    
  Photocopier 
         
1,800.00  
         
1,836.00  
         
1,872.72  
          
1,910.17  
         
1,948.38    
  Computers/Equipment 
         
2,400.00  
         
2,448.00  
         
2,496.96  
          
2,546.90  
         
2,597.84    
  Wages and Salaries 
     
152,042.07  
     
140,616.22  
     
128,082.28  
      
174,593.27  
     
161,504.79    
  Total 
   
223,242.07  
   
202,840.22  
   
191,550.76  
   
239,331.12  
   
227,537.40    
  *Accounting and Legal Costs higher in year one to account for incorporation, etc.    
  *Assumption: Rate of inflation of 2% per annum      
  * Administration expenses are fixed and will not increase as the volume of timber managed by 
the cooperative increases 
  
    
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.   
                  
 
 
 
              
  Table B21: Administration Expense per Cubic Metre 
Harvested 
  
    
         
  Year Total Harvest (m3) Admin. Exp ($/m3)   
  1 40,439.00 $5.82    
  2 80,878.00  $2.66    
  3 121,317.00  $1.68    
  4 161,756.00  $1.56    
  5 202,195.00  $1.19    
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  Table B22: Log Sort Yard Background - Labour Rates   
                 
  Loader Operator Wage  Yard Foreman Wage  
Annual Productive 
Hours 2000   
  Wage 20.000 /Hr  Wage 27.000 /Hr        
  CPP 0.495 /Hr  CPP 0.668 /Hr        
  EI 0.280 /Hr  EI 0.378 /Hr        
  Vacation 1.154 /Hr  Vacation 1.558 /Hr        
  WCB 0.764 /Hr  WCB 1.031 /Hr        
    22.693 /Hr    30.635 /Hr        
  Source Data: IO Financial Data, 2010.           
                            
 
 
 
 
          
  Table B23: Log Sort Yard Capital Costs    
       
  Site Development Capital Cost   
  Item Value Data Source   
  Land Cost  $    70,000.00  IO Financial Data, 2010.   
  Site Preparation Costs  $    45,000.00  IO Financial Data, 2010.   
  Maintenance Building Cost  $  140,000.00  IO Financial Data, 2010.   
  ATCO Office Trailer Cost  $    30,000.00  www.kijiji.ca   
  Total Cost  $    85,000.00      
  Interest Rate 4.45% Bank of Canada, 2011.   
  Amortization period 20 Years CRA, 2010.   
  Annual Cost  $    21,544.44      
       
       
  Slasher Capital Cost   
  Item Value Source   
  Equipment Cost $     68,242.00  www.forestryequipment sales.com   
  Amortization Period 5 Years CRA, 2010.   
  Interest Rate 4.45% Bank of Canada, 2011.   
  Annual Cost  $    15,248.28   Per Slasher   
       
       
  Loader Capital Cost   
  Item Value Source   
  Equipment Cost  $    95,000.00  IO Financial Data, 2010.   
  Amortization period 5 Years CRA, 2010.   
  Interest Rate 4.45% Bank of Canada, 2011.   
  Annual Cost  $    21,227.16   Per Loader   
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  Table B24: Log Sort Yard Productivity Data   
       
  Loader Productivity*   
  Unloading Treelength 94 m3 per hour   
  Loading Shortwood 90 m3 per hour   
  Servicing Slasher 115 m3 per hour   
       
       
  Slasher Productivity**   
  Volume Slashed 20.385 m3 per hour   
  * Loader productivity values account for 10% down 
time. 
  
    
  ** Slasher productivity values account for 10% 
down time. 
  
    
  Source Data: IO Historical Operations Data, 2010.   
    
     
 
 
 
 
                    
  Table B25: Log Sort Yard - Loader Requirements    
            
  Year 
Fibre 
Volume 
Handled 
Loader 
Hrs 
Required - 
Unloading 
Loader Hrs 
Required - 
Loading 
Loader 
Hrs 
Required - 
Slasher 
Total 
Loader 
Hours 
Required 
No. Of 
Loaders 
Required   
  1           40,439               430                449               352               1,231  1   
  2           80,878               860                899               703               2,462  1.25   
  3         121,317            1,291             1,348            1,055               3,694  2   
  4         161,756            1,721             1,797            1,407               4,925  2.5   
  5         202,195            2,151             2,247            1,758               6,156  3   
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  Table B26: Log Sort Yard - Slasher Requirements   
         
  Year 
Fibre Volume 
Handled 
Total Slasher 
Hrs Required 
No. of Slashers 
Required   
  1              40,439                 1,984  1   
  2              80,878                 3,968  2   
  3            121,317                 5,951  3   
  4            161,756                 7,935  4   
  5            202,195                 9,919  5   
              
 
 
 
 
              
  Table B27: Average Sort Yard to Mill Haul Distance Calculation    
         
  
Timber 
Class Shipping Area 
% of Total Allocation 
Shipped to AreaƗ 
Average Shipping 
Distance to Area (in 
km) 
Contribution to 
Average Overall Haul 
Distance (km)   
  S2 
PA NORTH 
(S2 MILLS)* 51% 
                           
22.95                 11.75    
  S1 
PA NORTH 
(S1 MILLS)** 5% 57.6                 2.81    
  S1 
PA SOUTH (S1 
MILLS)*** 9% 48.95                 4.18    
  S1 
PA WEST (S1 
MILLS)**** 11% 152.5                16.75    
  S1 
PA EAST (S1 
MILLS)***** 24% 115                28.07    
    
Average Overall Shipping Distance     (one-
way in km)                63.55    
         
  
*PA NORTH (S2 MILLS) shipping area average distance is based on sending products to Meath Park, 
Spruce Home, and Redwing.   
  
**PA NORTH (S1 MILLS) shipping area average distance is based on sending products to the Lakeland 
Region.   
  ***PA SOUTH (S1 MILLS) is based on sending products to Lily Plain and Rosthern.   
  ****PA WEST (S1 MILLS) is based on sending products to Big River and Leoville.   
  
*****PA EAST (S1 MILLS) shipping area average distance is based on sending products to Love, 
Choiceland, and Whitefox   
  Ɨ Values based on mill locations and allocations provided by Saskatchewan Forest Service Branch.   
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  Table B28: Sort Yard to Mill Hauling Cost Calculation   
        
  Item Value Units   
  Average Haul Distance (return)  127.11  km   
  Average Haul Speed 90 km/hr   
  Average Haul Time (Loading inc.)      2.41  hr   
  Trucking Cost per Hr 150 $/hr   
  Haul Cost per Load  361.85  $/load   
            
 
 
 
 
                  
  Table B29: Sort yard to Mill Hauling Costs: Year 1 through Year 5*    
           
  Year 
Volume 
Harvested 
Average 
Volume  per 
Load 
Total No. 
of Loads 
Cost per 
Load Total Cost Cost/m3   
  1   40,439.00  67           604   $361.85   $   218,399.63   $    5.40    
  2   80,878.00  67        1,207   $361.85   $   436,799.26   $    5.40    
  3 121,317.00  67        1,811   $361.85   $   655,198.89   $    5.40    
  4 161,756.00  67        2,414   $361.85   $   873,598.52   $    5.40    
  5 202,195.00  67        3,018   $361.85   $1,091,998.15   $    5.40    
           
  
* Operating under the assumption that all products harvested within the year will be removed 
from the log sort yard and shipped to various IO mills.   
  
*Operating under the assumption that all volume produced will go to IO mills with PAFMA 
allocations.    
  
*In the event that assumption 2 does not hold, all fibre sold to external mills will be sold, at a 
minimum, on a 100% cost recovery basis.   
                  
 
 
 
 
 
                          
  Table B30: IO NGC Log Sort Yard Operations Costs (in $)   
               
  Year Mortgage 
Loader 
Capital 
Cost 
Slasher 
Capital 
Cost R & M* Fuel Cost 
Loader 
Labour 
Cost 
Slasher 
Labour 
Cost 
Foreman 
Labour 
Cost 
Total 
Cost 
Average 
Cost 
($/m3)   
  1      21,544   21,227       15,248    11,604      39,409     27,939     45,017     61,271  243,260        6.02    
  2      21,544   42,454       30,497    18,899      78,817     55,877     91,835     62,496  402,422        4.98    
  3      21,544   42,454       45,745    21,949    118,226     83,816   140,508     63,746  537,991        4.43    
  4      21,544   63,681       60,993    29,244    157,634   111,755   191,091     65,021  700,968        4.33    
  5      21,544   63,681       76,241    32,293    197,043   139,694   243,640     66,321  840,464        4.16    
  * Repair and Maintenance calculated as 20% of Annual Equipment Cost       
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APPENDIX C: SECONDARY DISCUSSION: 
 
Modeling the Multiple Cruise Effect and the Potential Benefits of Cooperative Timber 
Cruising  Among Saskatchewan’s Independent Operators 
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Introduction 
The independent operators (IOs) are small forest operators with timber allocation 
volumes in Saskatchewan forests below 15,000 m³. As may be expected, this group is 
characterized by above-industry average wood procurement costs and transaction costs. The 
intuitive reasons for this are related to economies of scale.  In the past, IO’s above average costs 
were not a problem because market prices were above average for their products and they faced 
limited competition within markets. In recent years however, forest product markets have 
become increasingly competitive which has been confounded by low demand and low prices.  
Additionally, operating costs have risen faster than inflation because of higher fuel and energy 
costs.  As such, there is a need to restructure operations to reduce costs and increase IO’s 
competitiveness.   
In earlier works, I have hypothesized that the best way for the IO’s to reduce their costs is 
through the formation of a cooperative. This will not only create economies of scope for the IO’s 
but will also allow for the elimination of the competitive inefficiencies that exist within the 
industry; this will have the effect of further reducing the IO’s production costs. Wood 
procurement costs make up a substantial proportion of the average IO’s total costs (Vermette, 
2007). Timber cruising is the first step and thus the first cost incurred in the timber procurement 
process. It could be argued that timber cruising is the most important part of the timber 
procurement process as it determines the quantity, quality and proximity to the mill of the wood 
that will be harvested by the firm. Currently, the IO’s competitively timber cruise stands within 
the same geographical area and do not share the results of their research. A common result is that 
the firms end up cruising the same stands and all coming to the same no harvest conclusion. This 
results in both firm and industry timber cruising costs which are much higher than they would be 
in the presence of information sharing between the firms. I have coined this “the multiple cruise 
effect”.  
This paper begins by providing background into the current situation and then provides a 
framework for the timber cruising cost model under the current system. In the sections that 
follow I provide a counterfactual situation in which information sharing is present and derive a 
timber cruising cost model for that situation. Finally, I explore the efficiency gains obtainable 
through cooperative timber cruising.  
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Background 
Saskatchewan’s IOs are required to operate within the predefined boundaries of the pre-
existing Forest Management Agreement (FMA) Areas to which their forest product permits 
(FPPs) are assigned. FMAs are 20 year tenure agreements formed between the provincial 
government and large forest producers that operate large pulp and paper mills or sawmills within 
the Province. There are five FMA’s within Saskatchewan’s commercial forest area. The IOs 
involved in this study all hold allocations within the Prince Albert FMA, which is held by 
Domtar who co-owns the Prince Albert Pulp and Paper Mill with the provincial government.  
 
The FMA is located in the lower portion of the boreal forest and consists primarily of 
White Poplar (Populus alba), Black Poplar (Populus nigra), White Spruce (Picea glauca), Black 
Spruce (Picea mariana), and Jack Pine (Pinus banksiana). The latter of these species is by far 
the most highly demanded by forest product producers in the province; this is due to the fact that 
it is the softest timber, which also makes it the most sawable, formable, and the best suited for 
pulp and paper production. The FMA contains a high volume of Jack Pine (Pinus banksiana) but 
decades of large scale timber harvesting and the advance of Dwarf Mistletoe (Arceuthobium 
americanum) in the southern portions of the FMA, have significantly depleted easy access, low-
cost harvestable timber in the southern most portion of the FMA. Of course these areas have 
been reforested but given that many of these Pinus banksiana stands are in the very early seral 
stages of growth (5 to 20 years old) and that the majority of the forest producers harvest Pinus 
banksiana stands that are 70 to 90 years old, these areas will not be available for commercial 
production for a couple of generations. Most of the remaining merchantable timber within the 
FMA lies in areas within the southern portion of the FMA that have limited access as a result of 
poor road development and wet or unstable summer ground conditions and the northern portion 
of the PAFMA which, in general, has limited access as a result of poor road development and 
sheer distance from the processing mills. This situation has increased the cost of fibre to the mills 
and thus created a greater incentive for firms to engage in timber cruising activities aimed at 
locating the lowest cost timber.  
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Timber cruising is conducted by foresters who begin by analyzing GIS data obtained 
from the Saskatchewan Forest Inventory Database. When analyzing the GIS data the forester 
selects focus areas with large stands of the target species that are within the target age range for 
the mills raw timber requirements. Since road building costs can make up a significant portion of 
the timber costs, stands that are in close proximity to existing roadways are favoured (Gunn and 
Richards, 2000). Hauling costs also make up a considerable proportion of timber procurement 
costs and as such target areas that are in closer proximity to the mill site are also favoured 
(Vermette, 2007). Once target areas have been defined, the areas are scheduled to be “cruised” 
by the firm’s foresters. In the case of remote areas that are located more than several kilometres 
from an existing roadway an initial aerial survey, which may consist of random ground drops to 
allow the foresters to perform small scale sampling, is conducted to determine if there is 
sufficient timber potential to warrant full scale ground reconnaissance. In the case of areas that 
are less than a few kilometres away from a pre-existing roadway the aerial survey is generally 
skipped and the forester proceeds to direct ground reconnaissance. During ground 
reconnaissance a field crew constructs random sample plots and assesses the trees within the 
plots to determine the stands qualitative and quantitative properties, with the most important of 
these properties being the percentage of utilizable wood in the stand and the stand density. 
 
Timber cruising can decrease the cost of wood by providing qualitative increases, 
quantitative increases, and proximity gains. Qualitative increases result from the discovery of 
stands that have higher utilization values than the majority of stands currently being targeted by a 
firm. Higher utilization decreases real input costs by increasing the quantity of finished product, 
and in some cases the grade of finished product, produced with each unit of input. For example, a 
firm pays $50 per cubic metre for timber and of that cubic metre thirty percent is waste wood 
that will be discarded and seventy percent is useable wood that will be used in production. The 
real cost of timber is actually equal to the price paid divided by the utilization percentage, which 
in this case is equal to $71.43 per cubic metre. Thus any increase in the utilization percentage 
that results from actively seeking better quality wood results in a real price for the timber input 
which is closer to the actual price paid for the timber (a cost savings). In the case of an increased 
grade, i.e. finding timber that produces grade “A” lumber instead of grade “B” lumber, the 
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qualitative increase is realized by the firm in the form of an additional price premium received 
for the higher grade end product. 
 
Quantitative increases result when the firm finds stands that have a higher density or 
yield than the majority of the stands that they are currently targeting. Targeting higher yield 
stands has the effect of reducing costs such as road building costs and camp costs, assuming that 
the stands are of equal size and distance from existing road infrastructure as the lower yield 
stands currently harvested. For example, assume we have two stands that are equal in area and in 
distance from the pre-existing roadway and that we will need to establish a camp at each stand 
during the harvest period and then remove it when harvesting has been completed. The cost of 
road building to access each of the stands is $20,000 and the camp costs associated with each 
stand are $10,000. Stand one has a total area of 100 hectares, a stand density of 100m³/ha, and 
thus a total yield of 10,000m³. Stand two has a total area of 100 hectares, a stand density of 
150m³/ha and thus a total yield of 15,000m³. The resulting cost per cubic metre for road building 
and camp costs for stand one are three dollars per cubic metre and the same costs for stand two 
are two dollars per cubic metre. Thus, quantitative increases can result in substantial decreases in 
access costs and camp costs. 
 
Proximity gains are achieved by finding harvestable timber as close as possible to the 
mill site. This has the effect of significantly reducing the transportation costs that make up 
approximately 25% of the raw timber costs for the average medium sized mill (Vermette, 2007). 
Harvesting timber in close proximity to the mill provides some additional less tangible benefits 
to the mill including the ability to more effectively manage the harvesting site, as it is easier for 
upper management, production yard quality control personnel, specialized equipment mechanics, 
and supply delivery personnel to make regular day trips to sites that are a short haul away versus 
sites that are located a considerable distance from the mill. In the past few years proximity gains 
have been one of the central goals of the IOs and many of the firms have invested considerable 
resources timber cruising for merchantable timber in the southern portion of the FMA, this has 
been growing in both incidence and intensity as the increase in fuel prices (which make up a 
large portion of the heavily mechanized activity of timber harvesting and hauling) has brought 
the imaginary line ,within which timber harvesting and hauling at that distance is feasible, ever 
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closer to the production mills. This has had the effect of concentrating the timber cruising efforts 
of the firms into a relatively small geographical area. 
 
Concentrating timber cruising efforts of the IO’s into a small geographical area would not 
be an issue if the firms shared the results of their timber cruises, but at the current time they do 
not. This reluctance to share information stems from the fact that the firms all demand timber 
that is within the same species and age class. As such, any low cost timber harvested by another 
firm reduces their access to low cost timber. The result of this is that then firms have developed a 
highly competitive and secretive nature with one another. The reluctance to share information 
also stems from the fact that the information sharing firms cannot internalize the positive 
spillovers that they provide to other firms, nor do they have any assurance of reciprocation from 
the receiving firms and thus there is a further disincentive to share information with other firms. 
The result of this is that currently the firms end up timber cruising the same stands and thus 
duplicating effort. Since the firms generally have the same quality standards, they generally 
come to the same harvest or no harvest conclusion the majority of the time. This duplication of 
effort by each firm involved in the industry results in a much higher level of timber cruising 
effort expended on each stand in the area and much higher timber cruising costs for firms than if 
they were to share information; I have called this the multiple cruise effect.  
 
The Timber cruising Model 
The results of a literature review conducted for this study revealed that there has been 
little research in the area of timber cruising; this is especially true when it comes to competitive 
timber cruising among firms. The reasons for this stem from the fact that a sizeable proportion of 
the timber harvested in Europe and the United States is harvested on private land, in which case 
there is no competition and only one cruise is performed for inventory purposes. The remainder 
of the timber harvested in the United States, as well as in many parts of Europe, is publicly 
owned but is allocated through a direct auction sale system instead of the tenure agreement 
system currently used in Canada. In the case of an auction, the government agencies that manage 
the forests perform one cruise for inventory purposes and share that information with the firms 
bidding on the timber; thus only one cruise occurs on stands allocated through a direct auction 
sale system. The existence of competitive timber cruising and the multiple cruise effect is then 
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rather unique to the tenure agreement forest resource allocation system that is widely used in 
Canada.  
 
If one considers the nature of timber cruising, it is simply a search process comparable to 
an individual searching for a job. The most useful result, in terms of applicability to this study, 
which has been derived from research into job search models, is the notion of a stop rule. 
(Coughlin and Zaretsky, 1995) A stop rule defines the point at which an individual/firm 
discontinues their search for whatever it is they are searching for; this generally occurs at the 
point at which the limiting constraint is satisfied. (Brown et Al., 1985; Coughlin and Zaretsky, 
1995) In Saskatchewan, forestry companies that hold annually renewable forest product permits 
are permitted to reserve and schedule forest stands for the following year’s operations. This 
allowance forms the basis for the primary timber cruising investment constraint in this model as 
there is no incentive for firms to invest in timber cruising forest stands for which they cannot 
secure cutting rights. As such the firms will stop timber cruising in each period when they have 
found a volume of harvestable timber (TV) which is equal to their annual allowable cut volume 
(AAC). 
In addition to the stop rule constraint, there are also a number of feasibility constraints that must 
be satisfied in order for a block to be harvested. The feasibility constraints that must be satisfied 
in order for harvesting of a block to be deemed feasible are related to minimum opening sizes, 
minimum utilization percentages, maximum hauling distance from mills, maximum distance 
from pre-existing road infrastructure, and minimum harvest volumes. Naturally, since the firms 
are profit maximizing, the economic goal is to minimize average timber cruising costs. This 
diverse combination of spatial constraints, volume based constraints, economic constraints, and 
qualitative constraints that are often governed by human decision making principles make 
modelling timber cruising an extremely complex problem. The problem is so complex, in fact, 
that without the use of advanced computer algorithms and programming techniques it would 
more than likely be almost impossible to develop a solvable model. Following this realization, a 
review of literature pertaining to the use of search heuristics in forestry related problems was 
conducted. 
 
The TS Method 
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When reviewing the literature it was found that several other studies had applied search 
heuristics to a number of complex forestry related problems with the most interesting of these 
being the Tabu Search (TS) heuristic. Tabu Search is a unique local search framework that 
utilizes short term and long term memory structures to generate a search history and provide 
essential feedback on that history. The short term memory structures provide feedback on the 
previous moves during the search by making them “tabu” and ensuring that there is no repetition 
of previous moves (Gunn and Richards, 2003). This has the effect of eliminating duplication of 
effort from the system and when applied to our timber cruising model would ensure that the 
same stands are not cruised twice. The long term memory structures ensure that, in the case of 
multiple iterations, the same search path is not repeated. (Caro et Al. 1997) Performing multiple 
iterations is important because the TS heuristic does not achieve the known fully optimized 
solution in one iteration, but rather returns a local maximum or minimum which is near to the 
known optimal solution after each iteration. Generally a maximum number of iterations will be 
chosen by the researcher and the best solution from the group of iterations will be accepted as 
being the most optimal. In the case of our timber cruising problem, the solutions provided by 
each iteration represent different local maximum/minimum values that are attainable given the 
search path that is followed.  
The history of the search that is generated in TS can also be used to develop a set of 
intelligent problem solving principles, this allows for the emulation and incorporation of human 
problem solving principles into our model (Gunn and Richards, 2000). This feature is extremely 
useful in the timber cruising model as it will allow us to emulate the decisions that would be 
made by a forester during the timber cruising process.  The ability of the TS to solve complex 
optimization problems by simultaneously satisfying a combination of spatial and economic 
constraints is also an important feature (Caro et Al., 2006; Gunn and Richards, 2003; Greber and 
Laroze, 1997).  This feature will allow us to combine the constraints that govern the timber 
cruisers decisions while at the same time satisfying the profit maximizing objectives of the firm. 
These features combined with the fact that there “no requirements for linearity, continuity, or 
convexity in objective functions or constraints” make the TS heuristic an attractive modelling 
tool for a combinatorial problem such as timber cruising (Gunn and Richards, 2003). Detailed 
discussion on the programming language and operations of TS have not been included in this 
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paper as it is not within the scope of this discussion, but curious readers are referred to (Glover, 
1990) for a more detailed description of the TS heuristic. 
 
Due to the nature of our search problem it must be modelled in two phases. The initial phase 
is the search of GIS information to determine timber potential for reconnaissance work. GIS data 
obtained from Saskatchewan’s Forest Inventory Database, which contains both spatial and 
biological information concerning the forest areas within the PAFMA will provide us with the 
data required for the first phase of the search. The second phase of the search is the 
reconnaissance portion of the timber cruising activity. It is during this phase that major decisions 
on harvestability of targeted stands are made by the forester. Consequently, this phase is much 
more resource intensive and most of the timber cruising costs are incurred here. The data for the 
second phase of the search will be a combination of GIS data used in phase one and the sampling 
data obtained by the foresters during reconnaissance work. To construct the two phase timber 
cruising search model which will be solved using the TS method we will begin by deriving our 
phase one feasibility constraints.  
 
Phase One Feasibility Constraints: 
(1) Minimum Opening Size of 10 hectares 
Min(Open) = 10 ha 
 
(2) Maximum Distance from Pre-existing Road Infrastructure 
Max(Distance) = (Br*Vi)/ARC 
Where, 
Br = Budgeted Road Cost per Cubic Metre 
Vi = Volume in Stand 
ARC = Average Road Building Cost per km 
 
(3) Maximum Hauling Distance to Mill 
Max(Haul) = (Bh*Vi)/AHC 
Where,  
Bh = Budgeted Hauling Cost per Cubic Metre 
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Vi = Volume in Stand 
AHC=Average Hauling Cost per km 
Note: For Non-isolated stands in close proximity (<1km apart) total volume for each stand may 
be pooled to determine whether or not constraint (2) is satisfied. 
 
If all of the phase one constraints are simultaneously satisfied it is determined that there is 
significant potential to timber cruise the area. Sample data obtained during the timber cruising 
process will then added to our database at which time phase two of our TS model will be 
utilized. The phase two feasibility constraints which determine whether or not a stand will be 
deemed harvestable are shown below. The utilization constraint and minimum opening size 
constraint values which will be used are based on this authors experience as a forester for one of 
the IO’s from 2005 through 2008, and as such are deemed to be current. The remainder of the 
constraints are functions of the firm’s budget allocations to the various activities in the timber 
cruising process.  
 
Phase Two Constraints 
(1) Minimum Utilization Percentage of 70% 
U≥70% 
 
(2) Minimum Harvest Volume  
Min(Vh) = M/(Bm) 
Where,  
M = Expected cost of moving/relocating forestry operation 
Bm = Budgeted moving cost per cubic metre 
Vh = Harvestable Volume in Stand 
 
(3) Maximum Distance from Pre-existing Road Infrastructure 
Max(Distance) = (Br*Vh)/ARC 
Where, 
Br = Budgeted Road Cost per Cubic Metre 
Vh = Harvestable Volume in Stand 
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ARC=Average Road Building Cost per km 
 
(4) Maximum Hauling Distance to Mill 
Max(Haul) = (Bh*Vh)/AHC 
Where,  
Bh = Budgeted Hauling Cost per Cubic Metre 
Vh = Harvestable Volume in Stand 
AHC = Average Hauling Cost per km 
 
(5)Minimum Opening Size of 10 hectares 
Min(Open) = 10 ha 
 
 
Note: For Non-isolated stands in close proximity (<1km apart) total volume for each stand may 
be pooled to determine whether or not constraints (2) and (3) are satisfied. 
 
 
If the stand that is being cruised simultaneously satisfies all of the phase one and phase two 
constraints, the firm will make the decision to harvest the stand and if it does not simultaneously 
satisfy all of the constraints the firm will make a no harvest decision. The stand volumes (Vh) for 
each stand for which a harvest decision is made will be summed to derive the total volume of 
harvestable timber the firm has found during their timber cruising activities (TVf). Timber 
cruising will continue only up until the point at which the stop rule of has been satisfied; this 
occurs at the point where the total harvestable timber found by a firm during their timber cruising 
activities (TVf) is equal to the firm’s annual allowable cut (AACf) Mathematically, this can be 
represented as: 
Stop Rule: ∑Vi=TVf=AACf 
  
The Timber Cruising Cost Model 
For ease of modelling it will be assumed that all of the IO’s have equal annual allowable 
cuts, invest equal amounts in timber cruising, budget equal amounts to the same harvesting 
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activities and have equal feasibility and utilization standards. Although this may seem to be a 
vast extension from the current situation it really is not that far off. There is some variance in the 
annual allowable cuts of the IO firms that engage in timber cruising, but it is not large enough to 
change the cost structure of the firms. The notion that they have similar cost structures is further 
supported by the fact that these competitive firms sell their products for similar prices in 
competing markets, compete for inputs in a small local market, operate similar sized mills in the 
same geographical area, and employ approximately the same level of technology in their 
operations. As such, it is felt that the assumptions above will still provide an accurate 
approximation of the current situation. The basic total cost model for timber cruising is a 
function of labour costs, aerial survey costs, equipment costs, timber cruising travel costs, and 
research camp costs. The total timber cruising cost that is derived below includes all phase one 
and phase two timber cruising costs. 
 
Cost to Firm of Timber cruising a Geographical Area are Given By:  
TCf = xl*wl + xa*wa + xt*wt + k + r 
where, 
TCf = total cost of timber cruising the geographical area 
xl = number of forester labour hours 
wl = forester wage rate 
 xa = number of hours in aircraft 
wa = cost per hour for aircraft  
xt = number of km travelled 
wt = cost per km of travel 
k = timber cruising equipment costs 
r = research camp costs 
 
 
Timber cruising Costs per Cubic Metre for Firm are Given by: 
ACf = TCf/TVf 
Where, 
TVf=Total volume of merchantable timber cruised by firm 
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Assuming that the firms have been acting on the basis of profit maximization, the timber 
cruising cost optimization problem for the firm is given by: 
Min ACf = (xl*wl + xa*wa + xt*wt + k + r)/TVf 
s.t. TVf≤ AAC 
where, 
TVf =∑Vh 
and Vh 
s.t.       U≥70% 
Min(Vh) = M/(Bm) 
Min(Open) = 10 ha 
Max(Distance) = (Br*Vh)/ARC 
Max(Haul) = (Bh*Vh)/AHC 
 
AC is chosen as the objective function instead of TC as it incorporates the total 
harvestable volume (TVf) into the function being optimized. Inclusion of TV in our optimization 
problem is important because the central goal of the timber cruising firm is not just to minimize 
the cost of timber cruising all wood (regardless of whether or not it is deemed harvestable), but 
to minimize the timber cruising cost on the wood deemed harvestable (TVf). Due to the presence 
of fixed costs in the form of research camp costs and timber cruising equipment costs, the above 
optimization problem solved using a Tabu search algorithm framework should return the AC 
value for the situation in which the stop rule has been initiated at which point TVf equal AACf. 
As such we can calculate total costs for the firm (TCf) by multiplying the optimized AC value by 
TV.  
Since information is not shared, we will assume that in the long run all of the firms will 
cruise the same stands and generate the same no cut decisions. As such, the industry cost (TCi) 
for timber cruising the geographical area is given by the number of firms (n) multiplied by the 
value of each firms total timber cruising expenditure (TCf). 
TCi =n*TCf 
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Counter-factual Timber Cruising Cost Model 
The lack of information sharing that results in duplication, often many times over, of 
effort by firms is not a problem that is unique to competitive timber cruising firms in forestry. 
This phenomenon is highly discussed in studies pertaining to the activities of firms engaged in 
innovation based research and development. These firms, much like the IOs in this study, are 
often highly competitive and have similar research objectives (Kamien et Al, 1992). Because of 
this they often make large independent investments in research which leads them to the same 
discovery, the result of this is that the level of expenditure on their discoveries end up being 
much higher than they would be if they had shared information (Kamien et Al, 1992; Hagedoorn 
et Al, 2006). Unfortunately, in most cases, there is no incentive for the firms to share as they 
only recognize the marginal benefits that they receive from conducting research and sharing their 
results, which is equivalent to the marginal benefit that they receive from not sharing their 
results. The positive spillovers from knowledge transfer are only captured by the firms receiving 
the knowledge and although this shifts the social marginal benefit curve to the right, it has no 
impact on the sharing firms individual marginal benefit function; and thus no impact on the 
firm’s behaviour. Despite this lack of incentive, many firms engaged in innovation based R&D 
have found an efficient solution, which ensures 100% information transfer, removes the 
possibility of duplication, and results in maximized firm profits. This solution has been found 
through the creation of research joint venture cartels (Kamien et Al, 1992). 
In research joint venture cartels, firms cooperatively fund and engage in research that 
they would have otherwise undertaken independently. By sharing the knowledge that firms 
already have, pooling research resources, and eliminating duplication they are able to greatly 
decrease the cost of the ideas that they generate (Hagedoorn et. Al, 2006; Kamien et Al, 1992). 
In addition, the cooperative research allows the firms to pool risk and spread it evenly among the 
participants; this has the effect of increasing the firm’s incentives to invest in R&D (Hagedoorn 
et Al., 2006). 
 
In the counter-factual version of the IOs’ timber cruising activity, firms would 
cooperatively timbercruise and share 100% of their information. Each firm would invest an equal 
amount in timber cruising and cooperatively plan their timber cruising with the other firms, 
preferably through a centralized forestry research department. As a result of the cooperative 
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planning each stand would only be timber cruised once and the resulting harvestable stands 
would be divided equally among the participating firms. One potential issue that may be raised 
by firms is that not all of the stands that are found to be harvestable are going to be of equal 
utilization and that there is a potential for inequality in terms of research dollars expended per 
cubic metre of utilizable raw timber received. In the case of the PAFMA IOs, the intent is to 
solve this problem through the extension of the cooperative model to timber harvesting, log 
processing, and log distribution. The quantities of utilizable material would then be equalized in 
the process of distributing utilizable logs equally to the firms. 
 
 The counterfactual model would lower both industry and firm timber cruising costs as 
duplication of effort would be eliminated and thus less money would be invested in timber 
cruising the same geographical area.  The proposed model would also lower timber cruising risk 
(the probability of an unsuccessful cruise) for each firm by pooling the risk and dividing it 
equally among the firms. The differs from the factual case in that the lack of information sharing 
between the firms results in a situation in which all firms incur the maximum level of timber 
cruising risk by timber cruising all blocks independently. The timber cruising cost framework for 
the counterfactual case is shown below. 
 
Industry Timber Cruising Costs are Given by: 
TCi= xl*wl + xa*wa + xt*wt + k + r 
where, 
TCi=total cost of timber cruising the geographical area 
xl= number of forester labour hours 
wl=forester wage rate 
 xa=number of hours in aircraft 
wa=cost per hour for aircraft  
xt=number of km travelled 
wt=cost per km of travel 
k=timber cruising equipment costs 
r=research camp costs 
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Since the industry is working cooperatively and duplication of effort has been eliminated, 
the TC function for individual firms in the factual case can now be represented in a form similar 
to the TC function for industry in the counterfactual case. The timber cruising cartel that has 
been formed by the firms is still governed by the profit maximizing nature of the firms and as 
such the objective function will be similar to that in the factual case. The optimization problem 
which will be solved using a Tabu search method is given by: 
Min ACi= (xl*wl + xa*wa + xt*wt + k + r)/TV 
s.t. TVi≤ AACi 
where, 
TVi=∑Vh 
and Vh 
s.t.       U≥70% 
Min(Vh)= M/(Bm) 
Min(Open)= 10 ha 
Max(Distance)= (Br*Vh)/ARC 
Max(Haul)=(Bh*Vh)/AHC 
 
It should be noted that in this case the annual allowable cut given by AACi is equal to the 
summation of the annual allowable cuts of the firms in the counterfactual case. Total industry 
costs are easily calculated by multiplying the optimized ACi value by the total volume of 
harvestable timber (TVi) found during the timber cruising cartels cruise. Given that all of the 
firms involved in the timber cruising cartel share the expenses and results of the timber cruise 
equally their total timber cruising costs are given by: 
TCf=(TCi/n) 
Where n= the number of firms operating in the geographical area 
 
The obvious result of cooperative timber cruising and the elimination of duplication is 
that the inefficiencies that are present in the current competitive timber cruising system are 
eliminated. The industry efficiency gain is given by: 
Efficiency Gain=TCfactual – TCcounter-factual 
Efficiency Gain=(n* L+K+G+A+C)-( L+K+G+A+C) 
109 
 
Efficiency Gain=(n-1)*( L+K+G+A+C) 
 
The individual efficiency gain realized by firms is then given by: 
Efficiency Gain Realized by Individual Firms=[(n-1)*( L+K+G+A+C)]/n 
 
Conclusions 
The Tabu Search Method appears to provide a very useful framework for deriving timber 
cruising constraints.  Further, the ability of the TS Method to incorporate the spatial, economic, 
and stop rule constraints and to incorporate human problem solving techniques into a 
mathematical optimization framework has resulted in the creation of a model that is an accurate 
representation of the current timber cruising cost model.  The incorporation of collective action 
into the timber cruising cost model in the counterfactual case reveals that in theory there is 
potential to extract significant efficiency gains from cooperative timber cruising or the formation 
of a timber cruising cartel. Moreover, optimization of the counterfactual timber cruising cost 
model using the TS method results in the maximized profits for IO firms and the IO industry as a 
whole. As such, it appears that elimination of the multiple cruise effect through cooperative 
timber effect has the potential to reduce timber cruising costs for IO firms and to increase the 
competitiveness of the individual firms. Although, this study does not use empirical data to 
quantify the economic significance of the efficiency gains, it is expected that the gains will 
continue to rise as the price of inputs continues to rise and as the supply of easily accessible, low 
cost timber continues to fall. In future studies of this problem, I hope to fit empirical data to the 
model specified above, as well as several different model specifications, and test the models to 
determine if the model I have specified best fits the data. 
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